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Escape Clause Relief in the EEC and the United
States: Different Approaches to the Dilemma of
Adjustment to a New World Trading
Environment
Thomas A. Behney, Jr. *
The world trading system today features a great deal of uncer-
tainty and pressure for greater protection of national industries.'
Nations are being asked to ensure that local industries will not be
overwhelmed by a flood of imports. At the same time, most trading
nations have signed on to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 2 (GATF) that limits the amount and kind of protection a na-
tion may grant to local industries. Thus, nations are somewhat con-
strained in their ability to respond to the political pressures created
by manufacturers seeking relief. The general rule in GATT prohib-
its nations from penalizing imports and restricting their free flow
across national boundaries.
One of the exceptions to the general rule in GAIT is a provision
allowing a nation to impose penalties on imports if a domestic indus-
try is either threatened with or is currently experiencing serious in-
jury as a result of increased quantities of those imports. This section
of GATT is often referred to as the escape clause.3 The escape
clause allows nations to enact rules which enable them to avoid their
obligations under GATIT.
Both the European Economic Community (EEC) and the United
States have established rules for an escape clause. The two systems
differ both in the way the statutes and regulations are worded and in
the way that they are applied. The distinctions between them and
* Associate, Morrison & Foerster, Washington, D.C. Former Attorney to the Chair-
man, U.S. International Trade Commission. J.D., LL.M., Georgetown University Law
Center. The views represented in this Article are attributable solely to the author and in
no way represent the views of the Commission.
I See M. Langley, Protectionist Attitudes Grow Stronger in Spite of Healthy Economy, Wall St.
J., May 16, 1988, at 1, col. 6. According to a poll cited in the article, a majority of Ameri-
cans now believe that a country's economic power is more important that military power in
determining the country's status in the world. See also D. GREENAWAY, TRADE POLICY AND
THE NEW PROTECTIONISM (1983).
2 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-11, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
3 Id., art. XIX.
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the relative merits of each system take on increased importance as
the world's trading nations attempt to achieve the delicate balance
between the political pressures for increased protection of domestic
industries and the desire for the benefits of an open world trading
system.
This Article analyzes escape clause legislation and cases in both
the EEC and the United States. The Article first discusses the basic
framework for trade regulation, as presented in GATT. The Article
then considers EEC regulations and cases, followed by a discussion
of the U.S. escape clause statute and cases. The Article then analyzes
the strengths of both systems and the provisions in each system that
would be most useful in the current world trade environment.
I. Framework Under GATr
International rules of trade are governed to a large degree by
GATT. Founders of GATT intended that it would serve as a mecha-
nism for reducing tariffs and barriers to trade and for eliminating
discriminatory treatment of products in international commerce. 4
The general thrust of GATT is the lowering of barriers to trade.
However, within the general framework of an open trading system,
GATT does provide exceptions to the general rule of lower tariffs
and nondiscriminatory treatment of imports. GATT allows an ex-
ception when a particular industrial sector in a country is threatened
with or is presently suffering from serious injury as a result of im-
ports.5 Article XIX of GAT states:
If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the .effect of
the obligations incurred by a contracting party under this agree-
ment, including tariff concessions, any product is imported into the
territory of that contracting party in such increased quantities and
under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to do-
mestic producers in that territory of like or directly competitive
products, the contracting party shall be free, in respect of such prod-
uct, and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to pre-
vent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in
part or to withdraw or modify the concession.
The EEC Member States and the United States, as GATT signa-
tories, are bound to follow this standard if they wish to apply sanc-
tions against imports. 7 If either finds that a domestic industry is
threatened with or is experiencing serious injury, it may impose
sanctions. 8 These sanctions normally consist of increased tariffs or
4 Id., preamble.
5 See id., art. XIX.
6 Id., art. XIX, § 1 (a).
7 In fact, the regulation of this area in the Member States and the United States
closely tracks Article XIX. See infra notes 12-28 and accompanying text, and notes 146-97
and accompanying text.
8 GATT, supra note 2, art. XIX.
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quotas, and GATT allows these sanctions to stay in place until the
injury is "prevented" or "remedied." 9
The United States originally proposed including this article
within GATT as a way of accommodating countries with a domestic
industry that suffered as a result of tariff concessions. This set of
circumstances is no longer necessary for a finding that escape clause
relief is appropriate.' 0 In essence, GATT has recognized the value
of having a safety valve (the escape clause) on the international trad-
ing system to release some domestic political pressure.
II. The European System
• The EEC trade policy mirrors that of GATT: the underlying
principle is the free circulation of imports." I The EEC deviates from
this principle when necessary to prevent serious injury to an EEC
industry. If serious injury occurs or threatens an EEC industry, the
EEC can impose safeguards.
A. EEC Regulations
The current regulations governing the imposition of safeguards
are outlined in Council Regulation (EEC) No. 288/82.12 This regu-
9 Id. It is generally accepted that relief is applied in a nondiscriminatory fashion in
these cases. See E. MCGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION 292 (1986). A number
of scholars in Europe, however, question this principle, and the EEC itself has not always
applied the principle. See, e.g., Bronckers, The Non-Discriminatory Application of Article XIX of
GAYT." Tradition or Fiction?, 7 LEGAL ISSUES EUR. INT. 35 (1981/82).
10 That is, there is no need to link the serious injury or threat of serious injury to a
tariff concession made under GATT negotiations.
II See GATT, supra note 2, art. XI; see also Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 113(1), 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 60 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
12 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 35) 1 (1982) [hereinafter Regulation 288/82], amended
by Council Regulation (EEC) No. 571/86, 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 56) 67 (1986)
(amending, on account of the accession of Spain and Portugal, Annex I of Regulation
(EEC) No. 288/82 on common rules for imports), and Council Regulation (EEC) No.
1243/86, 29 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 113) 1 (1986) (amending Regulations (EEC) No.
288/82, (EEC) No. 1765/82 and (EEC) No. 1766/82 on common rules for imports). -Reg-
ulation 288/82 replaced Council Regulation No. 926/79, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 131)
15 (1979). Regulation 288/82 superseded the previous regulation covering safeguard
measures to provide the Community with "more precise criteria for assessing possible
injury," to adopt a new investigative procedure, and to meet the "desire for simplicity and
greater transparency of import arrangements" in the EEC. See Regulation 288/82, supra,
preamble. The earlier regulations which considered fairly traded imports were Regulation
(EEC) No. 1439/74 of the Council, 17 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 159) 1 (1974), Council
Regulation (EEC) No. 1025/70, 13 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 124) 6 (1970), and Council
Regulation 2041/68, 11 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 303) 1 (1968). Regulation 288/82 does
not cover textile imports or imports from nonmarket economies, which are considered in
other regulations. Regulation 288/82, supra, art. 1, para. 1. See Council Regulation (EEC)
No. 1765/82, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 195) 1 (1982) (control of fairly traded imports
from nonmarket economies); Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1766/82, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 195) 21 (1982) (regulation of fairly traded imports from the People's Republic of
China). Imports from Cuba are also regulated separately.
These regulations do not preclude Member States from limiting imports on the
grounds of public policy, morality, security, health and safety, foreign exchange reasons,
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
lation gives the Community the power to protect domestic industry
against serious injury or the threat of serious injury caused by in-
creasing imports.'8 The regulations encompass three basic proce-
dures for safeguarding EEC industries: investigation, surveillance,
and the institution of protective measures.
1. Investigation
The investigation process is triggered by information from a
Member State to the Commission or by self-initiation of the Com-
mission.' 4 After receipt of a petition or motion by the Commission,
an Advisory Committee is formed to conduct a preliminary hearing
(called a consultation) and to determine whether an investigation is
necessary. 15
In the information submitted to the Commission, Member
States must include import trend data covering import volumes, im-
port prices, and the substantial injury caused by imports. 16 If the
Member State alleges the threat of serious injury to the domestic in-
dustry because of imports, the submission must also contain infor-
mation on the potential effect if these products enter the EEC in
increased quantities. 17
Information on import volumes considers absolute numbers of
imports, and the relative and absolute market share of imports.' 8
The second element, import prices, is concerned mostly with price
undercutting. 19 The third element, substantial injury caused by im-
ports, relates to the impact on EEC producers of increased imports
of the like product. 20 The analysis of EEC producers focuses on do-
or other treaty obligations. See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1243/86, 29 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 113) 1 (1986).
The legal basis for the regulation is Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome. Treaty of
Rome, supra note 11, art. 113.
13 The starting point for these regulations is the same as GATT: the ideal is the
liberalization of imports with no quantitative restrictions. Regulation 288/82 allows the
EEC to take measures to protect domestic industry if there is any "danger created by
trends in imports." See Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, preamble.
14 Id., arts. 3, 4. Member States can inform the Commission if the trend of imports of
a particular article seems to require surveillance or protective measures. Id., art. 3.
15 The Advisory Committee is made up of representatives from each Member State
and is chaired by a Commission representative. Id., art. 5, para. 1. The Advisory Commit-
tee discusses the information presented and possible remedies. Id., art. 3, para. 2.
16 See id., art. 9, para. 1.
17 See id., art. 9, para. 2.
18 Id., art. 9, para. 1(a).
19 Id., art. 9, para. 1(b). The EEC looks at a price comparison between the imported
product and the domestic product. Id. At the U.S. International Trade Commisssion
there has been a great deal of discussion about the validity of these comparisons. See Cer-
tain Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1994, Inv. No. 731-
TA-349 (Final) at 63-79 (July 1987) (Additional Views of Vice-Chairman Anne E.
Brunsdale).
20 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, art. 9, para. 1(c). The regulation actually looks
at the producers of "similarly or directly competitive products." Id.
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mestic industry trends, such as production, capacity utilization,
stocks (inventory), sales, market share, price suppression or depres-
sion, profits, return on capital, cash flow, and employment. 2 1 If the
Commission is investigating the threat of substantial injury, the in-
formation submitted includes data on the rate of increase of imports,
the export capacity of foreign producers, and the likelihood that this
capacity will end up in the EEC.2 2 If, after receiving this data, the
Advisory Committee decides that an investigation is warranted, the
Commission announces and initiates an investigation.
23
The Commission begins the investigation by considering the
claims made in the petition. 24 The Commission gathers additional
information on import trends and prices, as well as the state of the
domestic industry. 25 Any interested party is invited to participate.
2 6
After it concludes its investigation, the Commission sends a report to
the Advisory Committee. 27 After consulting with the Advisory Com-
mittee, if the Commission determines that surveillance or protective
measures are not appropriate in the case, the Commission publishes
a notice that the investigation is closed. 28 The Commission also has
the option of imposing surveillance on the product's entry into the
EEC or instituting protective measures to neutralize the effects of the
imports.
2. Surveillance
If the Commission determines that continued entry of a product
into the EEC presents a substantial threat of serious injury to EEC
producers, it can order that product placed under surveillance. 29
21 Id.
22 Id., art. 9, para. 2.
23 Id., art. 6, para. 1. The investigation is announced in the OFFICIALJOURNAL OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES. Id.
24 Id., art. 6, para. 2.
25 Id.
26 Id., art. 6, para. 4. Any party may present a written submission to the Commission.
Id., art. 6, para. I (a). If a party can show that he has special reasons for appearing before
the Commission, he may be allowed to do so. Id., art. 6, para. 4.
All information gathered by the Commission during its investigation that is deemed
confidential may not be revealed by the Commission without the express approval of the
provider. Id., art. 8. In general, governmental bodies attemping to collect this kind of
business information need to guarantee confidentiality to ensure the ease of gathering
information. See Anthony & Byrne, Confidential Information in ITC Injury Proceedings, 17 L. &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1-69 (1985).
27 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, art. 7, para. 1.
28 Id., art. 7, para. 2.
29 Id., art. 10, para. 1. The statute allows prior and retrospective surveillance. Prior
surveillance means that the importer can introduce the product into the EEC only upon
production of an import document. Id., art. 11, para. 1. Retrospective surveillance allows
surveillance a little further back in the past. The Community also allows retrospective
surveillance if the Community wants to impose surveillance in conjunction with some
other form of restraint on the product. See, e.g., Commission Regulation (EEC) No.
418/87, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 42) 25 (1987) (introducing retrospective Community
1990]
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Products under prior surveillance can be introduced into the EEC
only upon production of an import document, but there is no limit
on the amount that can be shipped into the EEC.30 Member States
must report all imports of the product under surveillance on either a
monthly or quarterly basis.31 Surveillance can be imposed for a pe-
riod up to twelve months, and can be renewed.3 2
Either a Member State or the Commission can request that an
Advisory Committee consider whether a product should be taken off
the surveillance list.3 3 In response to such a request, the Advisory
Committee considers the effects of surveillance and whether its ap-
plication is still necessary.3 4 The Commission will then decide
whether to amend or revoke the surveillance based on the considera-
tion by the Advisory Committee.35 A list of the products under sur-
veillance is published every year in early February. This list contains
all products and the countries within the Community for which those
products are under surveillance.3 6
In a few instances, products are under surveillance throughout
the entire EEC.3 7 However, most products are under surveillance
only in selected countries. The countries with the most products
under surveillance are France, Spain, and Portugal. Among the
products under surveillance by these three countries are horses for
slaughter, chocolate, coffee, oil cakes, petroleum oil, vulcanized rub-
ber, antisera and vaccines, reconstituted wood, silk yarn, cotton
waste, cold-rolled or cold-finished iron and steel bars and rods, un-
wrought manganese waste and scrap, nonelectric industrial and labo-
surveillance of imports of urea originating in third countries). The surveillance informa-
tion includes a detailed description of the product and the country of origin, the country of
shipment, the CCT heading, quantity, and value for customs purposes. Finally, the Com-
munity allows temporary surveillance for a shorter period of time than retrospective or
prior surveillance. See, e.g., Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 1245/87, 30 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 117) 17 (1987) (introducing temporary Community surveillance prior to
importation of certain products originating in Japan).
30 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, art. 11, para. 1, and art. 13. Unless other factors
are specified by the Commission or Member States, the import document should contain
the following information: (1) name and address of the importer; (2) description of the
product, including commercial description, tariff heads, country of origin, and the export-
ing country; (3) quantity of the product and price, indicated at CIF price free-at-frontier;
and (4) proposed date and place of importation. Id., art. 11, para. 2.
31 Id., art. 14.
32 See id., art. 10, para. 3. See, e.g., Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 3966/87, 30
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 371) 55 (1987). This regulation extended surveillance of video
tape recorders from South Korea for a full year.
33 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, art. 18, para. 1.
34 Id.
35 Id., art. 18, para. 2.
36 See, e.g., List of Products Subject to Surveillance, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 37) at
45 (1987) (updating of the 1982 NIMEXE Code of Annexes I and II to Council Regulation
(EEC) No. 288/82 of 5 Feb. 1982 on common rules for imports (situation on 1 Jan. 1987)).
37 For example, carnations and roses (CCT heading number 06.03 A I, A II) are
under surveillance throughout the EEC. Id. at 46. Socks and stockings (CCT Heading
60.03) are also under surveillance throughout the EEC. Id. at 55.
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ratory ovens, and microphones.3 8
Surveillance is used extensively in the EEC,39 and has certainly
proved to be a valuable tool in defusing trade tensions at an early
stage. Surveillance places a very slight burden on the importer, al-
lowing unrestricted imports of the product.40 Surveillance can be
implemented by the Community without much delay. The benefits
are fairly extensive. It appears that importers realize surveillance is a
warning that they have reached the acceptable level of imports and
any greater amount carries the risk of harsher sanctions.4 1 At the
same time, the review mechanism prevents EEC Member States from
abusing the process. The regulation orders the Advisory Committee
to keep surveillance in place only as long as its effect is necessary.4 2
Surveillance allows the EEC to react to domestic pressures without
placing a great deal of pressure on the international trading system.
3. Protective Measures
If the Commission determines that there is serious injury to the
domestic industry, it can implement protective measures to protect
EEC manufacturers. 43 These measures apply to all imports into the
EEC, but can be limited to imports into certain regions if a limitation
is desirable.44 Protective measures can be implemented immediately
in critical situations. 45
The Council has responsibility to act on the imposition of pro-
tective measures recommended by the Commission.46 The Council's
responsibility is "to prevent a product being imported into the Com-
38 Id. at 46.
39 In 1987, over 300 products were under surveillance. Id.
40 The only burden on the importer is the burden of complying with the reporting
requirements, which is not that significant; given the number and extent of documents
already required in international trade transactions.
41 In fact, it appears that importers respect these limits. No examples of a product
under surveillance which subsequently was the subject of an investigation for a protective
measure were found.
42 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, art. 18, para. 1.
43 At one point EEC Member States could implement protective measures unilater-
ally, but their power to do so has been removed by the Commission. See COM(86) 708
Final, Regulation submitted to the Council by the Commission.
44 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, art. 15, para. 3.
45 Id., art. 15, para. 1. If the Commission determines that the situation is "critial"
and that "any delay would cause injury which ... would be difficult to remedy," it can
immediately adopt the sanctions specified in article 16. Id. The Commission can do this
on its own motion or at the request of a Member State. Id. The Commission reports its
decisions regarding sanctions to Member States and the Council. Id., art. 15, para. 5.
Within one month, a Member can refer the decision to the Council. Id. The Council, at
that point, must confirm, amend, or revoke the decision of the Commission by qualified
majority. Id., art. 15, para. 6. If the Council does not act on a referral within three
months, the decision by the Commission to adopt or not to adopt protective measures is
revoked. Id.
46 Id., art. 15, para. 1. The Council votes on the recommendation, with a qualified
majority necessary to adopt any measure. Id. Qualified majority voting is a weighted aver-
age voting scheme in the EEC.
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munity in such greatly increased quantities and/or on such terms or
conditions as to cause, or threaten to cause, substantial injury to
Community producers of like or directly competing products. '47 No
particular method of restraint is mandated, so any appropriate rem-
edy may be implemented. 48
The most popular method of relief, and the only relief specifi-
cally mentioned in the regulations, is the imposition of quotas. 49 If a
quota is used, the EEC will attempt to maintain "traditional trade
flows."' 50 In establishing a quota, the Commission will also take into
account the volume of goods exported under contracts before the
institution of protective measures and the "need to avoid jeopardiz-
ing achievement of the aim pursued in establishing the quota." 5'
Protective measures are not directed at a specific country; they apply
to all products imported into the Community.5 2 The Council may,
however, limit protective measures to the imports intended for cer-
tain regions of the Community. 53
Protective measures have no time limit, but can be rescinded or
amended. 54 The Commission or a Member State can request that
the Advisory Committee study the effect of the protective measure
and whether its continuation is still necessary. 55 Following consulta-
tion with the Advisory Committee, the Commission determines
whether the protective measure should be amended or revoked. 56 If
the Commission makes an affirmative decision and if the Council has
acted on the protective measure, the Council then needs to act on
the revocation or amendment. 57 If the Commission acted alone on
the protective measure, as in the case of critical circumstances, the
Commission itself decides to amend or revoke the protective mea-
sure.58 The absence of any right of appeal to the judicial system re-
inforces that the process is a political one and not a standard
administrative proceeding. The regulations in this area are very
straightforward and are comparable to the rules of the U.S. system.
47 Id., art. 16, para. 1(a).
48 See id., arts. 15, 16.
49 See, e.g., infra notes 97-102 and accompanying text; see Regulation 288/82, supra
note 12, art. 15, para. 2.
50 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, art. 15, para. 2. That is, the EEC will set up
quotas based on market shares held by foreign producers over a period of several years,
and will discount any recent surges in imports from any country.
51 Id.
52 Id., art. 15, para. 3(a).
53 Id. See also infra notes 96-102 and accompanying text. Products already en route to
the Community which cannot be shipped elsewhere are exempt. Regulation 288/82, supra
note 12, art. 15, para. 3(b).
54 See Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, art. 18.
55 Id., art. 18, para. 1.
56 Id., art. 18, para. 2.
57 Id., art. 18, para. 2(a). Any Council decision to change a protective order must be
by qualified majority. Id.
58 Id., art. 18, para 2(b).
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B. European Safeguard Cases
Several examples illustrate the use of this process. Two cases in
which protective measures were implemented will be examined, as
well as a case where the Commission found no serious injury or
threat of serious injury.
1. Watches
The first of these safeguard cases concerned electronic quartz
display watches. 59 The case originated from a French Government
request for a safeguard proceeding concerning watches from Japan,
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao, and South Korea. 60 The vast majority
of imports under investigation were from these five countries. The
discussion of the case started with analysis of the product under in-
vestigation as well as the parameters of the domestic industry.6 1
First, the Commission had to decide which products in the EEC were
directly competitive with the imported watches under investigation.
The Commission easily determined that digital watches compete
with each other.62 The Commission then considered the question of
whether domestic analog and imported digital watches were like
products and determined that products having the same uses, or
which are basically interchangeable, compete directly.63 Both kinds
of watches have the same uses, are commercially interchangeable,
and have essentially the same parts. 64 Therefore, they are like
products.
The Commission then sought to define the domestic industry,
which consisted of all EEC manufacturers of the like or directly com-
peting product. 65 Within the Community, France, West Germany,
59 See Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 1087/84, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 106)
31 (1984) (introducing protective measures in respect of certain electronic piezo-electric
quartz watches with digital display) [hereinafter Watches].
60 This case actually had a long and contentious history, even before the French Gov-
ernment request to initiate a safeguard proceeding. Prior to the request for safeguards,
the French Government had set quotas on the importation of watches from Hong Kong.
Hong Kong protested these quotas because it believed they were illegal under GATT, and
requested that a GATT panel examine the legality of the quotas. See Eur. Rep. No. 894
(Oct. 6, 1982). The GAT panel determined that the French quotas were illegal, which
led the French Government to attempt to restrict imports under the safeguard procedure.
The EEC agreed to investigate the French complaint on October 23, 1983. During a por-
tion of the period of investigation, the French Government was allowed to suspend im-
ports under Article 115 of the Treaty of Rome. The whole case was also controversial
within the EEC, with West Germany taking a free-trade position and France demanding
protection. See Eur. Rep. No. 1011 (Jan. 18, 1984).




65 Id. at 33.
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and the United Kingdom had producers of the like product. 66 The
producers in the United Kingdom only made parts and subassem-
blies and were not considered further by the Commission.67 The in-
dustries in West Germany and in France were very different from
each other. The West German industry was heavily concentrated in
clock-making production, while the French industry focused on
watches. 68 Because the producers in these two countries were so dif-
ferent, the Commission decided to study each country's producers
separately. 69
The Commission utilized trend analysis to monitor the changes
in the volume of imports, consumption, and prices over a period of
four years. 70 Imports of quartz digital watches into the Community
increased from 36.7 million units in 1980 to 45.1 million units in
1982. 7' Between 1980 and 1982, the number of imports into the
EEC increased at an annual rate of 12.2%.72 The Commission esti-
mated that domestic consumption of the product in the EEC stabi-
lized at between 63 and 65 million watches annually,7 3 which meant
that the market share of imports increased from 64.3% to 83.3%
between 1980 and 1982. 74 Imports into France increased from 4.5
to 9.6 million units, an average annual increase greater than 20%. 7 5
Import market share in France increased from 33.9% to 67.7% be-
tween 1979 and 1983.76 Imports into West Germany increased from
8.6 to 20.3 million units, an annual average increase of 25%. 77 This
increased the market share of imports in West Germany from 47.6%
to 84% between 1979 and 1983.78
While the average price of quartz watch imports remained sta-
ble, the price of imported liquid crystal display (LCD) watches, al-
ready much lower than the price of domestically produced watches,
dropped even further. 79 The Commission found evidence of signifi-
cant undercutting of prices between watches from Hong Kong, Tai-
wan, South Korea, Macao, and China on the one hand, and watches
from France.80 The price differences ranged from 12.1% to
66 Id. Italy also has a watchmaking industry, but it is "craft-based" rather than a true
manufacturing operation, and was not included within the scope of the investigation. Id.
67 Id. Additionally, there was only one producer in the United Kingdom.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 33-35.
71 Id. at 33. Imports for the first half of 1983 amounted to 22.3 million units. Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. Estimated market share in 1983 was 88.6%. Id.




79 Id. at 35. Between 1980 and the first half of 1983, the price of all imports went up
slightly, while the price of LCD watches dropped by 60%.
80 Id.
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77.4%.81 The Commission also found significant undercutting of up
to seventy-five percent between the price of West German analog
watches and imported digital watches. 82
The Commission then analyzed the domestic industry, looking
at sales, market share, firms, work force, and financial data. During
the period 1975 to 1983, French production dropped from 15 to 7.9
million units. 83 French producers' share of the home market
dropped from 55.7% in 1979 to 22.9% in 1983.84 The number of
firms in the industry decreased from 82 to 65, and the number of
workers fell from 4900 to 4000.85 During the same period, almost all
French producers incurred an increase in operating losses.86 The
Commission determined that the French industry was suffering sub-
stantial injury. 87
In West Germany, production of watches dropped from 5.9 to
3.1 million units between 1980 and 1983, a drop of 46.6%.88 Ger-
man market share of West German producers dropped from twenty
percent to ten percent over the same period.8 9 German firms sur-
veyed by the Commission cut employment by 52.1% percent be-
tween 1980 and 1983.90 Financial data obtained from West German
producers revealed losses over the period and a deteriorating finan-
cial position.91 The Commission therefore determined that the West
German industry was also suffering substantial injury. 92 These anal-
yses led the Commission to the conclusion that the domestic industry
was suffering substantial injury.
The Commission proceeded to examine any causal link between
imports and the injury to the domestic industry. 93 It determined that
a stable market, combined with increasing import penetration and
significantly lower import prices, proved that imports were responsi-
ble for the substantial injury suffered by the domestic industry.94
The Commission found no other cause that could explain the injury
to the domestic industry. 95 When considering the interests of the
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 36.
84 Id.
85 Id.








94 Id. at 37.
95 The Commission examined imports of mechanical watches into the EEC to deter-
mine whether they could be a cause of substantial injury. Id. The Commission found that
imports of these watchesfell over the period and, in fact, the absolute number of imports
of these watches had never been large enough to cause substantial injury to the domestic
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EEC, however, the Commission determined that West German pro-
ducers had already taken steps to insulate their firms from the effect
of imports. Therefore, protective measures would be implemented
only in France and not in West Germany.9 6
The Commission determined that the most effective method of
relief would be the imposition of quotas on imports of these watches
into France. The quota for each importing country would be based
in part on an average of the last three years of its imports into
France. 97 For Hong Kong, the largest supplier, the quota would be
based on a longer period to reflect trade flows more accurately. 98
These quota levels would increase annually by five percent 99 and
would remain in effect for three years.' 0 0 Following the final deci-
sion by the Commission, the West German Government appealed to
reverse the decision and remove the quotas.' 0 ' The Council, how-
ever, rejected the West German appeal and confirmed the Commis-
sion regulation instituting the quotas.' 0 2
2. Stoneware
The second case concerned pottery and stoneware with the re-
quest again coming from the French Government.10 3 Following con-
industry. Id. The Commission also considered whether LCD watches created a new mar-
ket distinct from the analog watch market, and should not be included in the injury analy-
sis. There were large sales of LCD watches, but a shift in demand was responsible for the
increased sales of these watches. Id. at 38. The Commission determined that demand for
these watches was essentially demand for a cheap watch and not demand for a new tech-
nology. Id. In addition, the Commission found the flat demand for all watches in Europe
to be very telling-the introduction of LCD watches did not create demand for a new
product. Instead, LCD watches replaced sales of other watches. Id. The Commission con-
cluded that imports were responsible for the substantial injury and these other factors
played only a small role in causation. Id.
96 Id. at 38-39. The Commission noted that the French Government had requested
relief. Id. at 38. The German Government did not request relief. The German producers
were divided as to the usefulness of relief, and the German industry was not as dependent
on watchmaking for revenue as the French industry. Additionally, the German industry
already had taken successful steps to restructure and reduce its dependency on watchmak-
ing. The geographic area in which the German watchmaking industry was located was
much more economically vibrant than the area where the French industry was located. Id.
at 38-39. Therefore, the Commission decided to apply protective measures only in




100 Id. at 40.
101 Eur. Rep. No. 1045 (May 26, 1984).
102 See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1830/84, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 172) 1
(1984) (confirming Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 1087/84, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
L 106) 31 (1984) introducing protective measures in respect of certain electronic piezo-
electric quartz watches with digital display).
103 See Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 3528/82, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 369)
27 (1982) (introducing protective measures in respect of imports into France and the
United Kingdom of tableware and other articles of a kind commonly used for domestic or
toilet purposes, or stoneware, and terminating the Community investigation procedure in
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sultation with the Advisory Committee, the Commission decided to
initiate an investigation. 10 4 These imports were coming primarily
from South Korea and Taiwan.' 0 5 In defining the like product, the
Commission decided that pottery and stoneware should be consid-
ered separately because of differences between the products. 0 6 The
Commission noted that pottery imports had not risen substantially
and that their market share was fairly low and stable. 10 7 The Com-
mission determined that any injury caused by these products was not
material and that there should be no protective measures
imposed. 108
The Commission reached a different result on stoneware. Stone-
ware imports increased dramatically between 1977 and 1982.109 In
addition, the share of the Community market taken by these imports
rose from 20.8%o in 1977 to 51.7% in 1981.110 The Commission
also found evidence that resale prices of imports were as much as
sixty-seven percent lower than domestic prices."'l The Commission
also noted that stoneware production in the Community remained
stable at roughly 30,000 tons while Community consumption
jumped from 33,433 tons in 1977 to 58,974 tons in 1981.112 Most
stoneware producers in the EEC lost money in 1981 and in the first
half of 1982, and fifteen percent of jobs in the Community industry
were lost between 1979 and 1982.113 The Commission found that
producers in France and the United Kingdom suffered serious injury
as a result." 14 Without analysis, the Commission determined that no
factor other than increased imports could have caused this serious
injury, and proceeded to consider remedies." 15
The Commission determined that injury was serious enough to
justify safeguards in France and the United Kingdom and that this
case presented critical circumstances which would permit the imme-
respect of articles of common pottery) [hereinafter Stoneware]. The discussion in this
case was not as extensive as that in the previously discussed case. This case was the first
one brought under the new regulations, which may explain the brevity.
104 See 25 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 144) 3 (1982) (notice of initiation of a Community
procedure for investigating the trend of imports of tableware and other articles of a kind
commonly used for domestic purposes, of common pottery or stoneware, originating in
certain third countries, the terms under which those articles are imported and the effects
of said imports on Community production).
105 Id.
106 See Stoneware, supra note 103, at 27-28.
107 Id. at 28.
108 Id.
109 Id. Imports rose from 6,965 tons in 1977 to 30,517 tons in 1981, and to 13,540





114 Id. at 28-29.
115 Id. at 29.
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diate imposition of sanctions.1 16 To avoid EEC sanctions, the South
Koreans attempted to negotiate voluntary restraint agreements
(VRAs) with the French and the British to resolve the dispute. The
Commission rejected that approach because it fell outside the proce-
dures established in Regulation 288/82, which limited the selection
of "defensive measures" to Community authorities."'i The Com-
mission decided to set quota ceilings based on both volume and
value for imports into France and the United Kingdom."18 The re-
straints were to be in effect from January 1, 1983, to December 31,
1985.11 9
Following the imposition of sanctions, negotiations continued
between the South Koreans and the EEC.' 20 As a result of these
negotiations, the Commission revoked the sanctions and replaced
them with automatic authorization of imports into France and the
United Kingdom based on the negotiated levels.' 2 ' The negotiated
quota levels were scheduled to last until December 31, 1985.122
France complained about the possibility of deflection of trade
within the EEC because the quotas were proposed only for imports
into the United Kingdom and France. The French alleged that as a
result, South Korean imports were entering other parts of the Com-
munity and were re-exported to France, thus circumventing the
quota. The Commission authorized France to conduct a surveillance
of all stoneware entering the country to prevent this.' 2 3 No further
action was taken in this case.
3. Glass
There have been cases where the Community did not institute
protective measures. For example, in 1985 Greece requested an in-
vestigation of imports of glass into Greece.' 2 4 The Greek Govern:
ment claimed that imports of glass from Spain, Turkey, and
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. The levels would be based on the average value and volume of imports for
1979, 1980, and 1981. Id. The level in France was 7,130 tons, with an annual value of up
to 12.26 million European Currency Units (ECU). In the United Kingdom', the level was
4,935 tons with an annual value of up to 6.05 million ECU. Id.
119 Id.
120 The South Koreans were the main exporters of the product.
121 See Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 873/83, 26 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 96) 8
(1983).
122 Id.
123 See Commission Decision, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 247) 8 (1983) (authorizing
the French Republic to introduce intra-Community surveillance in respect of imports of
tableware and other articles of a kind commonly used for domestic or toilet purposes, of
stoneware, originating in South Korea).
124 See 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 66) 12 (1985) (notice of initiation of a Community
proceeding to investigate the trend of imports into Greece of certain categories of glass
whether figured or not, the conditions under which these articles are imported and the
effects of the said imports on Community production).
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Yugoslavia were increasing and could cause serious injury to the
Greek industry. 12 5 Imports of glass into Greece increased dramati-
cally between 1982 and 1984.126 Total imports rose from 2,458 tons
in 1982 to 10,793 tons in the first 8 months of 1984.127 Imports
from the 3 countries under investigation increased from 288 tons to
7,193 tons during the same period. 128 The market share of non-
Community imports into Greece increased from 3.5% in 1980 to
31% in the first 8 months of 1984.129 The production of the sole
Greek producer declined precipitously over the period, resulting in
depressed financial results and a decline in employment.' 30 Greece
also alleged margins of price undercutting ranging from twenty per-
cent to thirty percent. 13 1 After consultation with an Advisory Com-
mittee, the Commission decided to investigate the case. 132
Following its investigation, the Commission determined that
other factors explained the difficulties the Greek manufacturer ex-
perienced.' 3 3 The Commission investigation confirmed Greek alle-
gations that imports of non-Community producers rose sharply
between 1981 and 1984 and that undercutting was occurring in the
Greek market.' 3 4 The Commission also agreed that the Greek pro-
ducer suffered serious injury in this case because production fell
sharply, facilities were closed, inventories grew, capacity utilization
dropped, and market share decreased. 135 However, the Commission
determined that a number of factors were responsible for the injury
to the domestic industry and therefore was unable to conclude that
increasing imports caused the serious injury.
The Commission began its analysis by noting that the Greek in-
dustry's decline started before the market share of imports increased
125 Id.




is0 Id. Production dropped from 65,137 tons in 1980 to 27,237 tons in the first 11




133 See 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 128) 7 (1986) (notice of termination of the Commu-
nity proceeding to investigate the trend of imports into Greece of certain categories of
glass whether figured or not, the conditions under which these articles are imported and
the effects of said imports on Community production). The Commission divided its inves-
tigation into two parts-one focusing on wired or figured glass, the other focusing on
drawn and float glass. Id. at 8.
134 Id. Imports of wired or figured glass rose from 0.4% of the Greek market to
18.9% in 1984. Id. Nearly all of the non-Community imports were from Turkey. Market
share of imports of drawn and float glass increased from 1.4% to 21.5% between 1981 and
1984. Id. These imports mostly were from Spain and Yugoslavia. Id. The Commission
found price undercutting ranging from 7% to 41%. Id. at 8-9.
135 Id. at 9.
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dramatically.' 3 6 In addition, several other factors caused harm to the
Greek glass industry.
First, imports from the rest of the Community increased sub-
stantially over the period. 137 Second, the market share of imports
from non-Community producers (other than Spain, Turkey, and Yu-
goslavia) increased from 3.3% to 18.3% during the same period.' 38
Third, consumption of glass in Greece dropped significantly over the
period of investigation, and by 1984, domestic consumption of wired
and figured glass represented only twenty percent of the Greek in-
dustry's annual capacity. 139 Consumption of drawn and float glass
remained stable over the period, but again Greek producers' capacity
far exceeded demand. In fact, over the period of investigation, the
Greek producers did not, at any time, approach the capacity utiliza-
tion necessary to break even financially in the drawn and float glass
industry. 140 Fourth, market demand was shifting to technologically
more complex glass, a product Greek producers were not equipped
to manufacture.14 Fifth, the Greek government instituted price con-
trols that limited the price that manufacturers could receive for glass
products. 142 The set prices were below the cost of production and
certainly contributed to the producers' financial losses. 143 Finally,
glass imports into Greece were already subject to antidumping du-
ties and protective measures under the EEC Treaty. 144 Because of
all the mitigating circumstances, the Commission determined that
causes other than imports were the substantial cause of injury to the
domestic industry. In addition, other mechanisms were already in
place to deal with any effect of unfair imports from these coun-
136 Id.
137 The market share of EEC imports of drawn and float glass increased from 16.4%
to 28.6% between 1981 and 1984. Id.
138 Id. This analysis, separating imports by country instead of considering all imports
as a whole, seems contrary to the procedure for considering all imports from outside the
Community in a safeguard case that was established in Regulation 288/82 . Regulation
288/82, supra note 12. The Commission later addressed this issue by noting that an analy-
sis including all non-Community imports would not have changed their conclusion dra-
matically. 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 128) at 10-11 (1986).
139 Id. at 10. Consumption dropped from 10,380 tons to 6,011 tons between 1981
and 1984. The annual capacity of the Greek producer over that period was 27,000 tons.
Id.
140 Id. The break-even point was estimated to be a capacity utilization rate of 70%.
The highest capacity utilization rate achieved during the period was 60%. Id.
141 Id. There was a marked shift in demand to float glass and away from drawn glass.
Id. The producer may have exacerbated his problems by investing in a drawn glass manu-
facturing line instead of a float glass line in 1980. Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 See Commission Decision 86/36 (EEC), 29 0.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 51) 73 (1986)
(accepting undertakings entered into in connection with the antidumping proceeding con-
cerning imports into Greece of certain categories of glass originating in Turkey, Yugosla-
via, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, and terminating the investigation);
see also Commission Decision 85/594 (EEC), 28 0.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 373) 9 (1985)
(protective measures Greece may undertake to stabilize its balance of payments).
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tries.14 5 Therefore, the Commission concluded that no surveillance
or protective measures were required.
It is interesting to note that these cases normally involve only
one or two countries in the EEC. This fact indicates that economic
integration has not yet occurred in the EEC and that pressure on
restricting imports still comes from Member States and industries
within those states. In addition, the cases and requests for surveil-
lance more often come from southern European countries.
Nonintegration of most industries is still present in the EEC, and the
level of competitiveness among industries in the different Member
States is still uneven. The reported decisions of cases contain the
bare minimum in terms of detail and analysis. The analysis used in
these cases offers the reader little guidance on the development of
law in the EEC. The opinions leave unclear the controversial areas
with which the Commission is dealing. The reader gets no indication
of development in the law or policy or even the use for which the
Community should put protective measures. The reports of cases
make it clear that the Commission is reporting only the facts of the
case and not the reasoning behind its decision.
III. U.S. Escape Clause Laws
The U.S. Government has the power to investigate and to imple-
ment protective measures under its version of the escape clause. It
thus has two of the three powers for safeguarding national industries
that the EEC has. The escape clause relief in the United States is
administered by the International Trade Commission (ITC or Com-
mission). 14 6 The Commission's power to investigate is triggered by
a petition for relief filed by a private party, a request from certain
sections of the U.S. Government, or on the Commission's own mo-
tion. 14 7 The private parties eligible to file a petition include trade
associations, manufacturing firms, and a certified or recognized
union or group of workers which is representative of an industry.148
Governmental officials able to trigger an action include the Presi-
dent, the U.S. Trade Representative, the House Ways and Means
Committee, and the Senate Finance Committee. 14 9
The purpose of the investigation is "to determine whether an
article is being imported into the United States in such increased
quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury, or the threat
145 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 128) at 11 (1986).
146 See 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1988).
147 Id. § 2252(a)(1), (b)(1)(A).
148 See Internal Combustion Engine Forklift Trucks from Japan, USITC Pub. 2082,
Inv. No. 731-TA-377 (Finai), at 55-58 (May 1988) (Additional Views of Vice Chairman
Anne E. Brunsdale).
149 19 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1), (b)(I)(A) (1988). The request from either congressional
committee is made in the form of a resolution.
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thereof, to the domestic industry producing an article like or directly
competitive with the imported article."' 50 The process followed by
the ITC is broken into two stages. At the first stage, the ITC deter-
mines whether a domestic industry is seriously injured or is
threatened with serious injury. 15' If the ITC makes an affirmative
finding on that point, it then explores various options for remedies
and sends its proposal to the President. 52 Both stages include a
public hearing and opportunities for interested parties to comment
and submit written and oral testimony.
In determining whether there is serious injury, the ITC must
first define the like product and the appropriate domestic indus-
try.' 53 The Commission is statutorily limited in the way it defines the
domestic industry. First, in cases where the domestic producers also
import, the ITC can include within its definition of domestic industry
only the domestic production of such producers. 54 Second, the
Commission may consider a particular geographic region of the
United States only if that region receives the bulk of imports and is
responsible for a substantial portion of domestic production. 155 The
ITC then looks at the volume of imports and determines whether
there has been an increase of imports, either actual or in relation to
domestic production.' 56 In addition, the Commission must analyze
the share of the domestic market held by domestic producers. 57
The Commission must next consider whether the domestic in-
dustry has been seriously injured or threatened with serious injury
because of imports.' 58 The statute does not define "serious injury"
or "threat of serious injury." However, the statute does list a number
of factors that the Commission should consider in making this deter-
mination. If the petitioner claims that the industry has been seri-
150 Id.
151 See id. § 2252(b)(2)(A). The Commission is required to make a decision within 120
days.
152 Only those Commissioners who voted affirmatively on the issue of serious injury or
the threat of serious injury are eligible to vote on the appropriate remedy for the domestic
industry. Id. § 2252(e)(6). If the Commission determines, by majority vote, that there is
no serious injury or threat of serious injury, the Commission does not enter the second
phase of the investigation. The entire investigation, from institution to final report to the
President, has a statutory limit of 180 days. Id. § 2252(0. The anticipated length of the
second stage of the investigation is 60 days.
153 This process is similar to the EEC process. "Like product" means an article like or
directly competitive with the imported article. Id. § 2251(a).
154 Id. § 2252(c)(4)(A). The Commission may consider only the U.S.-based produc-
tion of the manufacturer of the like or directly competitive article. This is becoming more
difficult as manufacturers increasingly ignore political boundaries in making production
decisions, thus leading to globalized manufacturing.
155 Id. § 2252(c)(4)(C).
156 Id. § 2252(c)(1)(C). There has been some controversy over this point in the past.
Commissioner Liebeler argued that the Commission need only examine actual figures. See
infra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
157 19 U.S.C. § 2252(c)(1)C) (1988).
158 Id. § 2252(b)(l)(A), (c)(l)(A), (c)(l)(B).
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ously injured, the Commission must consider, among other factors:
(1) any significant idling of productive facilities in the domestic in-
dustry; (2) the inability of a number of firms in the industry to oper-
ate at a reasonable level of profit; and (3) significant unemployment
or underemployment within the industry. 159
If the petitioner claims a threat of serious injury, the Commis-
sion must consider five factors. These factors are: (1) any decline in
sales or market share; (2) a higher and growing inventory; (3) the
extent to which firms in the domestic industry are unable to generate
adequate capital to finance the modernization of their domestic
plants and equipment, or are unable to maintain existing levels of
expenditures for research and development; (4) the extent to which
the U.S. market is the focal point for the diversi6n of exports of the
article concerned by reason of restraints on exports of such article
to, or imports of such article into, third country markets;' 60 and (5) a
downward trend in domestic production, profits, wages, or
employment. 161
In addition, the Commission must determine whether imports
are a substantial cause of serious injury to the domestic industry.
Imports must be a cause of the serious injury, and they cannot be any
less important than any other cause of injury to the domestic indus-
try. 162 In looking at serious injury, the Commission must consider
the condition of the domestic industry over the course of the rele-
vant business cycle.' 63 During this stage of the investigation, the
Commission must hold a public hearing, at which all interested par-
ties can present testimony and evidence in support of their
position. 1
An effort has been made to recast the escape clause relief section
of the statute as a section dedicated to positive adjustment.' 65 In-
dustries may now submit their plans for adjustment to import com-
petition to the Commission during the investigation. 166 The
159 Id. § 2252(c)(1)(A). When determining whether imports are a substantial cause of
serious injury or threat of serious injury, the Commission must consider an increase in
imports and a decline in the proportion of the domestic market supplied by domestic pro-
ducers. See id. § 2252(c)(1)(C).
160 Id. § 2252(c)(1)(C)(iii).
161 Id. § 2252(c)(1)(B). The Senate bill contained two provisions on threat which were
not enacted into law: the existence of foreign export targeting, and the existence of out-
standing preliminary or final antidumping and countervailing duty determinations. See S.
306, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1988).
162 19 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1)(B) (1988).
163 Id. § 2252(c)(2)(A). In considering general economic conditions that might affect
an industry's performance, the Commission cannot aggregate the causes of declining de-
mand associated with a recession or economic downturn in the U.S. economy into a single
cause.
164 Id. § 2252(b)(4).
* 165 In fact, the title of this part of the statute has been changed to "Positive Adjust-
ment by Industries Injured by Imports." See id. § 2251.
166 See id. § 2252(a)(4).
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petitioner may submit such plans at the time the petition is filed or
within 120 days of filing. 167 In addition, if the Commission reaches
an affirmative determination on injury, domestic firms, unions or rec-
ognized groups of workers, state and local governments, domestic
industry trade associations, or any other person or group of persons
may submit to the Commission commitments they intend to make in
order to adjust to import competition. 168 As the legislative history
accompanying the law indicates, Congress believed that it was im-
portant for firms and workers to show a commitment to positive ad-
justment to imports and not just to expect protection from
competition. 169
The second stage of the Commission's escape clause proceed-
ings involves selection of the appropriate remedy for recommenda-
tion to the President. Any remedy can be recommended, but the
remedy selected should be that action which would best address and
help resolve the specific injury suffered by the domestic industry. 170
Examples of appropriate remedies include tariffs, quotas, adjustment
assistance for workers and firms, tariff-rate quotas, and orderly mar-
keting agreements.'l7 Again, the Commission holds a public hear-
ing and conducts a staff investigation. 172 Those Commissioners who
determined that there was a serious injury or threat of serious injury
are able to vote on the appropriate remedy to recommend to the
President. 173 This phase normally lasts sixty days.
The explanation of the Commission's views on the case and sug-
gested remedies, as well as any dissenting or separate views, are in-
cluded in a report which is sent to the President. 174 The report
includes the Commission's determination on all factors required by
the statute and the reasoning behind its findings.' 75 The Commis-
sion will also include in the report any adjustment plan submitted by
interested parties, as well as information gathered by the Commis-
sion on plans that firms and workers in the industry have made to
adjust to import competition. 176 In addition, the report includes an
analysis of the effect of pursuing the recommended remedy on the
petitioning domestic industry, other domestic industries, and con-
sumers, as well as the effect of not pursuing the recommended rem-
167 The petitioner can have the U.S. Trade Representative or any appropriate federal
agency review the plan's adequacy. Id. § 2252(a)(5)(A).
168 Id. § 2252(a)(6)(B).
169 See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, Conference Report to Accompany
H.R. 3, H.R. Rep. No. 100-576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., at 663 (1988).
170 19 U.S.C. § 2252(e)(1) (1988).
171 Id. § 2252(e)(2)(A)-(E).
172 Id. § 2252(e)(5)(A).
173 Id. § 2252(e)(6).
174 Id. § 2252(0. This report must be sent to the President within 180 days of the
institution of the escape clause case by the Commission.
175 Id. § 2252(f)(2)(A), (B).
176 Id. § 2252(t)(2)(E), (F).
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edy on the petitioning domestic industry, its workers, the
communities where domestic production facilities are located, and
on other domestic industries. 77
A. Action. by the President
After the President receives the report from the Commission, he
is required to take all appropriate action to "facilitate efforts by the
domestic industry to make a positive adjustmient to import competi-
tion and provide greater economic and social benefits than costs."' 78
By statute, the President is required to consider the following: (1)
the Commission's report and recommendations; (2) the level of par-
ticipation by workers and firms in retraining efforts, manpower pro-
grams, and other forms of adjustment assistance; (3) efforts by the
domestic industry to adjust to import competition, including adjust-
ment plans; (4) the probable effectiveness of the relief chosen; (5)
short- and long-term social and economic costs and benefits; (6) fac-
tors relating to national economic interest (including the economic
and social costs borne by taxpayers, communities, and workers if re-
lief were not provided), effects of relief on consumers and domestic
consumption, and any effects on other U.S. industries due to com-
pensation; (7) the extent to which the United States is a market for
diverted foreign goods; (8) potential for circumvention of any rem-
edy; (9) national security interests of the United States; and (10)
other factors the Commission considers in making its remedy
recommendations. ' 79
The remedies available to the President include additional du-
ties, tariff-rate quotas, quantitative restrictions, adjustment measures
including adjustment assistance, orderly marketing agreements, auc-
tion quotas, initiating international negotiations to alleviate underly-
ing problems, submitting legislative proposals, and any other
appropriate action or a combination of the above.180 The President
has sixty days to determine what kind of relief, if any, is appropri-
ate.' 8 ' Remedies may be enacted for up to eight years. 182
When the President takes action, he must notify Congress. If he
177 Id. § 2252(f)(2)(G). This requirement was added by the 1988 Act.
178 Id. § 2253(a)(1)(A).
179 Id. § 2252(a)(2). The other factors that the Commission considers include the
form and amount of relief necessary to prevent or remedy the injury or threat, the commit-
ment to adjustment actions pledged by interested parties, any information on conditions
of competition in domestic or world markets, and the usefulness of international negotia-
tions to resolve the injury or help in the adjustment process. See id. §§ 2252(e)(5)(B),
2253(a)(2).
180 Id. § 2253(a)(3).
181 Id. § 2253(a)(4). The President can, within 15 days, request supplementary infor-
mation from the Commission. The Commission has 30 days to provide the information
and the President then has 30 days to complete the action. Id. § 2253(a)(5).
182 Id. § 2253(e). The President can recommend that relief remain in effect for eight
years or less. If he recommends that the period of relief be less than eight years, the relief
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decides to take no action or action different than that recommended
by the Commission, Congress, by enacting a joint resolution within
ninety days, can nullify the President's recommendation and have
the Commission's recommendation take effect.' 83
B. ITC Monitoring
The Commission has a very active monitoring program under
the statute. Any remedy imposed by the President or Congress must
be reported on by the Commission every two years starting with the
second anniversary of the date of implementation of the remedy.' 8 4
The Commission is charged with monitoring developments of how
firms and workers in the industry are adjusting to import competi-
tion. If the Commission receives a request from the President, the
Commission shall also consider the probable economic effect of ex-
tension, reduction, modification, or termination of the relief.185
C. Changes in Relief After Enactment
Under certain circumstances, the President can terminate, mod-
ify, or reduce relief granted under the escape clause. First, the Presi-
dent must have the report on the probable economic effects of the
change from the Commission. 186 Second, the President must seek
advice from the Secretaries of Labor and Commerce on the effect of
the change. 187 Third, the President must determine that either the
domestic industry has not made adequate efforts to adjust to import
competition, or the remedy selected has not been effective because
of changed economic conditions. The President must indicate the
changed circumstances that would support a reduction or termina-
tion of relief.188 The President can also reduce, modify, or terminate
relief if a majority of the domestic industry petitions him to do so.189
D. Relief on Perishable Goods
Domestic industries that produce perishable agricultural prod-
ucts are entitled to special relief under the new trade law. The antici-
pated relief is granted quickly. Within twenty-one days of receipt of
a request for relief, the U.S. Trade Representative must determine
whether the product in question is a perishable agricultural product,
can be extended once, but the total length of relief cannot exceed eight years. Id.
§ 2253(e)(1)(B).
183 See id. § 2253(c).
184 Id. § 2254(a). The Commission is required to hold a hearing before issuing these
reports. See id. § 2254(a)(3).
185 Id. § 2254(b).
186 Id. § 2254(b)(1)(A).
187 Id.
188 Id. § 2254(b)(l)(A).
189 Id. § 2254(b)(l)(B).
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and whether the product is being imported into the United States in
such increased quantities as to be, or likely to be, a substantial cause
of serious injury or threat of serious injury to the domestic indus-
try.190 If the Trade Representative makes an affirmative decision on
both issues, the ITC begins work on the investigation.
The Commission has two responsibilities after affirmative find-
ings by the Trade Representative: (1) "monitoring and investigat-
ing" imports of the product for up to two years and (2) determining
whether the domestic industry is suffering or is threatened with seri-
ous injury and setting the appropriate level of relief.191 First, on the
twenty-first day after the petition is filed, the Commission must de-
termine on the basis of available information whether increased im-
ports are a substantial cause of serious injury, or threat of serious
injury, to the domestic industry. 192 Second, the Commission must
find that the serious injury will be difficult to mitigate due to the per-
ishable nature of the product, or that serious injury would not be
prevented under a normal escape clause proceeding because of the
length of time involved.' 93 Third, the Commission must estimate
the amount or extent of provisional relief necessary to prevent or
remedy the serious injury or threat of serious injury. 194
All of this information is then put into a report that the Commis-
sion sends to the President.' 95 The President considers the report
and its findings on the appropriate level of. relief and, within seven
days, makes a decision on granting relief.196 The provisional relief
ordered by the Commission remains in place until the Commission
makes a negative determination, the President takes action to in-
crease the duty, the President decides to take no action, or the Presi-
dent decides relief is no longer warranted. 197
The most significant difference between this section and Regula-
tion 288/82 is the level of detail. The regulations, as described here,
are for the most part parallel. The U.S. statute tends to give less
discretion to the ITC on the kinds of analysis required and the facts
it must consider in an escape clause case. Congress has listed in
greater detail what it expects the ITC to consider, how the ITC
should consider certain facts and circumstances, and what the ITC's
options are in a number of different situations. This is also true of
the President's role in this process. Regulation 288/82 tends to
leave analysis by the Commission more open, which accounts for
190 Id. § 2252(d)(l)(A).
191 Id. § 2252(d)(l)(B), (C).
192 Id. § 2252(d)(1)(C).
193 Id.
194 Id. § 2252(d)(I)(E).
195 Id. § 2252(d)()(F).
196 Id. § 2252(d)(2)(B).
197 Id. § 2252(d)(4)(A).
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greater leeway in the decision-making process by the Commission.
In addition, the Commission is not compelled to address issues that
the ITC must address in order to satisfy Congressional concerns.
IV. U.S. Escape Clause Cases
Several recent cases illustrate the application of the escape
clause in the United States.
A. Steel Fork Arms
In a recent case on steel fork arms,' 98 the Commission determined
that a U.S. industry was not seriously injured or being threatened
with serious injury because of imports.199 In its opinion, 200 the ma-
jority noted the three statutory criteria that must be satisfied for the
Commission to find that imports were a substantial cause of serious
injury, or a threat of serious injury: (1) the imported article under
investigation is entering the United States in increased quantities; (2)
the domestic industry producing an article like or directly competi-
tive with the imported article is being seriously injured or is
threatened with serious injury; and (3) the increased imports are a
substantial cause of the serious injury or threat thereof to the domes-
tic industry. 20 1
In this case the Commission majority determined that imports
increased over the period of investigation but that the domestic in-
dustry, while experiencing economic difficulties, was not seriously in-
jured or threatened with serious injury.20 2
The majority began its analysis by defining the relevant domes-
tic industry as those domestic manufacturers who produce an article
"like or directly competitive with the imported article. ' 20 3 The ma-
jority examined the characteristics and uses of the products in ques-
tion to determine like product, an approach approved by the
legislative history. 20 4
198 Steel Fork Arms, USITC Pub. 1866, Inv. No. TA-201-60 (July 1986) [hereinafter
Steel Fork Arms]. Steel fork arms are used on forklift trucks or other heavy material-
handling vehicles. Id. at 4.
199 Id. The Commission's result was unanimous; however, it submitted majority views
and two sets of additional views on the case.
200 The majority opinion expresses the full views of Vice Chairman Brunsdale and
Commissioners Stern, Rohr, and Lodwick. It also expresses the partial views of Chairman
Liebeler and Commissioner Eckes, who submitted additional views. Id. at 3 nn.l-2.
201 Id. at 3 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (1982)).
202 Id.
203 Id. at 4 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (1988)).
204 The legislative history cited by the Commission states:
[L]ike articles are those which are substantially identical in inherent or
intrinsic characteristics (i.e., materials from which made, appearances, qual-
ity, texture, etc.), and "directly competitive" articles are those which,
although not substantially identical in their inherent or intrinsic characteris-
tics, are substanially equivalent for commercial purposes, that is, are adapted
to the same end uses and are essentially interchangeable therefor.
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The majority considered the facts about production of, and uses
for, steel fork arms and determined that the appropriate like product
was all steel fork arms and the appropriate domestic industry was all
U.S. producers of steel fork arms. 20 5 During the period of investiga-
tion, steel fork arms were produced in a wide variety of sizes by six
producers. 20 6 The Commission considered only the domestic pro-
duction of these six producers when evaluating the domestic indus-
try and excluded any foreign production. 20 7
The majority then analyzed the case in light of the three criteria
enumerated above. The majority quickly determined that imports
increased absolutely when measured both by value and quantity. 208
Relative to domestic production, imports also increased dramati-
cally.209 These facts led the majority to conclude that the require-
ment of increased imports had been fulfilled.
The second criteria, serious injury or the threat of serious injury
to the domestic industry, is more explicitly covered by the statute.
The Commission analyzed operating and financial data, as well as
conditions in the market for steel fork arms. 210 The majority con-
cluded that the domestic industry was suffering some "economic dis-
tress" but was not seriously injured. 211 In addition, the majority
H.R. Rep. No. 571, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1973); S. Rep No. 1298, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess.
122 (1974).
205 See Steel Fork Arms, supra note 198, at 4-6.
206 Two of the six producers, Joseph Dyson & Sons and GCN Inc., produced forklifts
for sale commercially. Id. at 5. Four producers, Yale Materials Handling Corp., Harlo
Products Inc., Clark Material Handling Products Inc., and Hyster Co. manufactured steel
fork arms for captive consumption only. Id. Of these four, only Yale and Harlo were still
producing in 1986, the year the Commission made its determination. Id. Two of the six
firms (Clark and Hyster) stopped production during the period of investigation, but be-
cause they did produce at some point during the five-year investigatory period, the Com-
mission decided to include them in the domestic industry. Id.
207 One of the producers, Dyson, imported steel fork arms from Toyoshima Special
Steel Co., Ltd. during the period of investigation and had signed an agreement with
Daewoo Heavy Industries to import steel fork arms. Id. at 6 n.14. Fork arms from these
foreign sources were not included in the consideration of the condition of the domestic
industry. See 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(3)(A) (1988).
208 Steel Fork Arms, supra note 198, at A-27 to A-28. Trends in imports are generally
measured over a five year period in ITC investigations. The increase in volume was 155%
and the increase in value was 45% over the period. Id. The exact volume and value
figures for imports were confidential in this investigation. Id. at A-28 n. 1.
209 Id. at A-28. Imports increased 95% relative to domestic production over the pe-
riod. Two of the commissioners, Vice Chairman Brundsdale and Chairman Liebeler,
voiced opposition to using relative import figures in this section of the Commission's anal-
ysis. Chairman Liebeler explained her position in her Additional Views. Id. at 17-30. See
infra notes 223-32 and accompanying text.
210 See Steel Fork Arms, supra note 198, at 7-14. The majority noted that the fortunes
of the steel fork arm industry were tightly linked to those of the forklift truck industry. See
id. at 8, n.21. The majority also determined that shipments of steel fork arms mirrored
domestic consumption of forklift trucks much more closely than domestic production of
forklift trucks, due to the large number of imported forklift trucks entering the country
without fork arms. Id. at 9.
211 Id. at 7.
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determined that the industry was not threatened with serious injury,
especially in light of the recent improvement in industry trends.
212
In its discussion, the majority noted that this industry had suf-
fered during the recession of 1982 to 1983 but had improved mark-
edly thereafter. Overall, for the period between 1981 and 1985,
most factors had improved. 2 13 Production was high in 1981,
dropped during the recession of 1982 to 1983, and then increased
greatly in 1984 and 1985.214 Production capacity increased by seven
percent during the period of investigation, and although capacity
utilization fluctuated during the period, it was roughly the same in
1984 and 1985 as it was in 1981.215 Inventory levels were low and
decreased throughout the period of investigation. 21 6 Employment
and total wages were lower in 1985 than in 198.1, even though em-
ployment in the industry increased after 1983.217 The majority was
reluctant to consider lower employment as a sign of serious injury;
instead, it noted that worker productivity and overtime work at com-
mercial manufacturers explained the overall decline in employ-
ment.21 8 Financial results showed that the industry as a whole was
profitable in 1984 and 1985.219 Net sales were higher in 1984 and
1985 than in 1981.220
The majority determined that these factors showed an industry
that had recovered reasonably well from the recession, not one that
was seriously injured or threatened with serious injury. 22 1 Because
212 Id. at 8. The Commission did not perform separate analyses of serious injury and
the threat of serious injury, as was commonly done in a number of other escape clause
cases.
213 Id. at 11-13. The industry was shifting increasingly to commercial, instead of cap-
tive production. In 1981, captive and open market shipments were roughly equal; by
1985, the majority of shipments were open market. Id. at 9-10. One of these open market
producers, Dyson, accounted for almost all open market shipments, and was the dominant
overall producer in the domestic industry. Id. at 9. Thus, data from Dyson tended to have
a large impact on industry-wide trends.
214 See id. at 11. Domestic shipment figures closely paralleled production figures. Id.
at 12. Specific figures on this industry are confidential, because of the dominance of
Dyson in the industry.
215 Id. at 11-12.
216 Id. at 13.
217 Id.
218 That is, following the recession of 1982 to 1983, when sales increased in the steel
fork arm industry, manufacturers increased productivity and turned to overtime work in-
stead of hiring more workers.
219 Steel Fork Arms, supra note 198, at 14. The Commission noted that these years
were the years of highest import penetration. Id.
220 In the interim, sales dropped significantly in 1982 and 1983. Id. Only Yale,
Dyson, and GCN submitted financial data to the Commission. Id. at 14 n.41.
221 The majority examined each of the factors mentioned above in some detail. It
noted that steel fork arm production, shipments, and inventories improved over the pe-
riod of investigation. Industry capacity increased and capacity utilization remained con-
stant. Employment declined, but worker productivity doubled over the period (showing
that the industry was making effort to increase productivity, not decrease production).
Finally, the industry operated at a profit over the last two years of the investigation. Id. at
14-15. The majority also considered the allegation that any injury reflected in the aggre-
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the majority determined that the domestic industry was not seriously
injured or threatened with serious injury, it did not address the issue
of causation. 222
The chairman of the agency, Susan Liebeler, presented addi-
tional views on the issues of increased imports and serious injury.
On the issue of increased imports, Liebeler argued that the "in-
creased quantities" in question must be absolute increases in im-
ports, not just increases in market share.223 Liebeler agreed with the
majority's finding that imports were rising absolutely as measured by
value and quantity.22 4
Liebeler then analyzed the serious injury standard in escape
clause relief cases. She noted that serious injury is a much stricter
standard than material injury, as stated in the legislative history ac-
companying the statute.225 She emphasized the deteriorated posi-
tion in which an industry would have to find itself to qualify as
seriously injured under the statute. Finally, she noted that this high
standard was consistent with the standard expressed in earlier Com-
mission discussions of serious injury. 226
gate industry figures was merely a reflection of mismanagement at Dyson, the largest firm
in the industry. Both Commissioners Rohr and Stern attached some weight to this alterna-
tive explanation for the difficulties experienced by at least one firm in the industry. Id. at
15 n.43.
222 Id. at 15 n.42.
223 Chairman Liebeler reached this conclusion through a careful analysis of the statute
and the legislative history. See id. at 18-20. The statute requires the Commission to "deter-
mine whether an article is being imported into the United States in such increased quanti-
ties as to be a substantial cause of serious injury, or threat thereof .... ." 19 U.S.C.
§ 2251(b)(1) (1988). Liebeler disagreed with the notion, expressed by several of her col-
leagues, that the requirement for increased imports could be satisfied by examining only
the market share of imports. See Steel Fork Arms, supra note 198, at 18-20; see also Carbon
and Certain Alloy Steel Products, USITC Pub. 1553, Inv. No. TA-201-51, at 27-28 (July
1984). Liebeler analyzed the plain meaning of this section and compared this section of
the statute to other sections where Congress clearly intended the Commission to examine
market share and included language to that effect. She determined that looking at relative
increases in imports, measured by market share, did not address the question of increased
imports, and therefore the Commission must look at absolute import figures. See Steel
Fork Arms, supra note 198, at 19-20.
224 Steel Fork Arms, supra note 198, at 21. Measured by volume, imports of steel fork
arms increased by 155% from 1981 to 1985. Measured by value, imports also increased,
although the figures used to reach that conclusion are confidential. Id. at 27 n.24.
225 In the Senate Finance Committee Report on the Trade Act of 1974, the Commit-
tee stated: "As barriers to international trade are lowered, some industries and workers
inevitably face serious injury, dislocation and perhaps economic extinction." S. Rep. No.
1298, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1974). Liebeler interpreted this section as defining "seri-
ous injury" to mean "a major contraction of a domestic industry or its extinction." See
Steel Fork Arms, supra note 198, at 24; see also Nonrubber Footwear, USITC Pub. 1717,
Inv. No. TA-201-55, at 32 (July 1985) (Views of Vice Chairman Liebeler); Potassium Per-
manganate, USITC Pub. 1682, Inv. No. TA-201-54, at 20 (Apr. 1985) (Views of Vice
Chairman Liebeler).
226 In the second case brought under the Act, a commissioner defined serious injury
as "an important crippling, or mortal injury, one having permanent or lasting conse-
quences." See Bolts, Nuts and Screws of Iron or Steel, USITC Pub. 747, Inv. No. TA-201-
2, at 19 (Nov. 1975) (Views of Commissioner George Moore).
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Liebeler also determined that the statute required her to focus
her inquiry on the factors of production in the domestic industry, not
on the providers of labor or capital to the industry under investiga-
tion.2 27 In her analysis of the domestic industry, Liebeler deter-
mined that the industry was not injured.228 She looked at
production which remained constant over the period.229 Capacity
and capacity utilization were also stable throughout the period. 230
Operating income improved in 1984 and 1985.231 She determined
that the data revealed that the industry was not doing extremely well,
but it was not suffering material injury. 23 2
Another Commissioner, Alfred Eckes, also provided additional
views solely on the issue of serious injury. Commissioner Eckes' anal-
ysis focused on the dominant producer in the industry, Dyson.2 3
He used data from 1981 to 1985, which included an entire business
cycle in this industry. 234 He noted that his analysis of the industry's
performance in 1984 and 1985 was very important to his decision. 235
In analyzing whether the domestic industry was suffering serious
injury, Commissioner Eckes focused on the three factors enumerated
in the statute. 236 Considering productive capacity, he noted that
production had fluctuated throughout the period with recent de-
clines due to decreased production by captive manufacturers. 23 7 He
stated that Dyson's production was much higher in 1985 than in the
beginning of the investigation.238 Declines in overall production ca-
227 See Steel Fork Arms, supra note 198, at 24-25.
228 Liebeler concurred with the majority that the domestic industry consisted of both
captive and commercial producers of steel fork arms. She reasoned that "the presence or
absence of vertical integration in the fork [lift] truck industry should not affect the merits
of the case." Id. at 27.
229 Id. at 28.
230 Id.
231 See id. at 29.
232 Id. at 30.
233 Commissioner Eckes based this approach on comments in the legislative history
accompanying the Trade Act of 1974. These comments state that the purpose of this sec-
tion of the statute is the protection of domestic productive resources involved in the pro-
duction of the articles under investigation. See H.R. Rep. No. 571, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess.
46 (1973); S. Rep. No. 1298, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 122 (1974). Because Dyson accounted
for most commercial shipments (the growing segment of the market) and because Dyson
substantially increased its share of total domestic shipments during the investigation,
Commissioner Eckes focused on Dyson's performance in his analysis. See Steel Fork Arms,
supra note 198, at 31-32.
234 See Steel Fork Arms, supra note 198, at 32. He noted that consumption of steel fork
arms was strong in 1981, declined sharply during the recession of 1982 to 1983, and then
bounced back as the economy recovered in 1984 and 1985. Id. at 32-33.
235 Id. at 33. He stated that his approach was consistent with that taken by a Commis-
sion majority in Wood Shakes and Shingles, USITC Pub. 1826, Inv. No. TA-201-56, at 9-
12 (Mar. 1986).
236 Specifically, he looked at significant idling of productive facilities, significant un-
employment, and the significant number of domestic firms operating at a reasonable level
of profit. Steel Fork Arms, supra note 198, at 33. See 19 U.S.C. § 2252(c)(1)(A) (1988).
237 See Steel Fork Arms, supra note 198, at 33.
238 Id. at 34.
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pacity occurred with two plant closings during the period of investi-
gation, which Commissioner Eckes determined did affect the
question of serious injury.239
Commissioner Eckes also noted that Dyson increased its capac-
ity during the investigation and that overall the capacity utilization
rate for the industry was only a few percentage points lower in 1985
than in 1981.240 Although the number of employees in the industry
declined throughout the investigation, the number of employees in-
creased at Dyson. Furthermore, employees at Dyson collected con-
siderable amounts of overtime hours and greatly increased their
productivity. 24 1 Thus, Commissioner Eckes concluded that the evi-
dence on employment was mixed and did not establish serious in-
jury. Finally, operating profits of the producers of a majority of
forklifts were positive during 1984 and 1985.242 Additionally, net
sales were greater in 1984 than in 1981.243 Commissioner Eckes
concluded that the steel fork arms industry had participated in the
economic recovery of 1984 to 1985, and was not experiencing seri-
ous injury.244
B. Wood Shakes and Shingles
In Wood Shakes and Shingles,245 the Commission determined that
a domestic industry was seriously injured and that imports were a
substantial cause of that serious injury. 246 The majority used the
same analytical framework as was used in Steel Fork Arms; 2 47 however,
239 He noted that one of the plant closings occurred in 1982, which was "remote in
time and does not provide much insight into the recent performance of the industry dur-
ing the market recovery." Id. Both Clark and Hyster shut down production because they
discovered that purchasing the fork arms would be cheaper than continuing to manufac-
ture them. Id. Commissioner Eckes thus attributes these plant closings not to the weak-
ened performance of the industry, but instead to sound business judgment. Id.
240 Id. at 35. Commissioner Eckes then examined trends in domestic shipments and
inventories. Commercial shipments increased by 16% over the period of investigation,
but overall shipments dropped from 1981 to 1985 due to declines in captive shipments.
Id. Inventories as a ratio of shipments dropped from 1981 to 1985. Id.
241 Id. at 35-36.
242 Id. at 36. Indeed, with sales volumes equivalent to 1981, the industry managed to
turn operating losses in 1981 into operating profits in 1985. Id.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 37.
245 USITC Pub. 1826 Inv. No. TA-201-56 (Mar. 1986) [hereinafter Wood Shakes and
Shingles].
246 Four commissioners-Chairman Stern, and Commissioners Eckes, Lodwick, and
Rohr-found serious injury to the domestic industry caused by increasing imports in this
case. Two commissioners-Vice Chairman Liebeler and Commissioner Brunsdale-found
no serious injury or threat of serious injury. Commissioners Eckes, Lodwick, and Rohr
recommended relief in the form of an increased tariff; Chairman Stern and Commissioner
Brunsdale recommended that adjustment assistance be granted to workers and firms in the
industry; and Vice Chairman Liebeler recommended that no relief be granted. Id. at I.
247 See supra notes 198-244 and accompanying text. The majority stated that the pur-
pose of the escape clause is to "prevent or remedy serious injury to the domestic produc-
tive resources which is substantially caused by imports, while facilitating adjustment to
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
the statutory factors were in greater dispute in this investigation.
Parties to the investigation disagreed about the makeup of the
like product and domestic industry categories in this investiga-
tion. 248 The petitioner argued that the like product consisted of all
wood shakes and shingles, and the domestic industry included all
producers of these products.2 49 Respondents countered by sug-
gesting four separate like products and domestic industries: western
red cedar shakes, western red cedar shingles, remanufactured west-
ern red shingles, and northern white cedar shingles.2 50 The majority
considered the respondent's arguments and rejected them.
According to the majority, the similarities between the various
types of shakes and shingles outweighed their differences. First,
western red cedar shakes and shingles are manufactured from the
same raw material, often at the same facility, and with the same work-
ers. 25 1 Second, all shakes and all shingles are manufactured in the
same manner and with the same equipment.252 Third, these prod-
ucts are all used for the same application-roofing and covering the
exterior of buildings. 253 Finally, consumers appear to choose shakes
or shingles for aesthetic and other factors not related to the "inher-
ent characteristics" of shakes or shingles.2 54 Because of these strong
similarities, the majority determined that wood shakes and shingles
comprised the like product, and that the domestic industry consisted
import competition." See Wood Shakes and Shingles, supra note 245, at 3 (citing 19 U.S.C.
§ 2251; H.R. Rep. No. 571, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1973); S. Rep. No. 1298, 93rd Cong.,
2d Sess. 119 (1974)).
248 The majority spent some time outlining the standard for "like" or "directly com-
petitive" products under the escape clause regulations. The majority cited the legislative
history on this point:
The words "like" and "directly competitive" . . . are not to be regarded
as synonymous or explanatory of each other, but rather to distinguish be-
tween "like" articles and articles which, although not "like", are "directly
competitive". In such context, "like" articles are those which are substan-
tially identical in inherent or intrinsic characteristics (i.e., materials from
which made, appearance, quality, texture, and etc.) and "directly competi-
tive" articles are those which, although not substantially identical in their
inherent or intrinsic characteristics, are substantially equivalent for commer-
cial purposes, that is, are adapted to the same uses and are essentially inter-
changeable therefor.
H.R. Rep. No. 571, 93rd Cong., ist Sess. 45 (1973); S. Rep. No. 1298, 93rd Cong., 2d
Sess. 121-22 (1974).
249 Wood Shakes and Shingles, supra note 245, at 2.
250 Id. at 4-5.
251 Id. at 5. Admittedly, shakes and shingles are produced on different machines. Ap-
proximately half of the domestic producers manufacture both shakes and shingles. Id. at 5-
6.
252 Id. at 5. Shingles were manufactured from two materials-nothern white cedar and
western red.cedar. Northern white cedar shingles tend to be manufactured and marketed
in the eastern United States, as opposed to western red cedar products, which are manu-
factured and sold in the western United States. Id.
253 Id. at 6.
254 Id.
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of all producers of wood shakes and shingles. 255
Respondents argued that if the Commission found one like
product in this investigation, the Commission should broaden the
like product category to include other roofing and siding materials,
such as asphalt shingles, aluminum siding, clay tiles, and other prod-
ucts. 256 The Commission determined, however, that the significant
differences in consumer perception, production processes, and pric-
ing patterns were sufficient to exclude these additional products
from the like product and dometic industry definitions.2 57
The majority determined that imports were increasing both ab-
solutely, and in relation to domestic production. 258 Imports of wood
shakes and shingles increased by 18% between 1983 and 1984, from
3.8 million squares to 4.5 million squares. 25 9 The most recent data
indicated that imports continued to increase, rising to 3.7 million
squares in the first 9 months of 1985 compared with 3.3 million
squares for the same period in 1984.260 The market share of domes-
tic producers over the same period fell from 41:2% to 33.9%, indi-
cating relative increases of imports.2 6' Therefore, the first criteria
for an affirmative finding was satisfied.
The majority also found serious injury or threat of serious in-
jury.262 The majority considered data collected over an entire busi-
ness cycle, from 1978 to 1985, and focused on the period from 1983
to 1985.263 Between 1983 and 1985, domestic consumption of wood
shakes and shingles remained stable.264 Despite this stability in the
market, domestic industry indicators fell during the period. Domes-
tic production, production capacity, employment, and the number of
firms in the industry all declined. 265 The available financial data in-
dicated a downturn in the industry's fortunes over the period. 266
255 Id. at 4-7.
256 Id. at 6.
257 Id. at 6-7.
258 Id. at 7-8. The majority argued that the increase can be either "actual or relative,"
citing the legislative history for this section of the statute. Id. at 7 (citing S. Rep. No. 1298,
93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1974)). Vice Chairman Liebeler and Commissioner Brunsdale
argued that this interpretation was incorrect. See infra notes 292-98 and accompanying
text.
259 Wood Shakes and Shingles, supra note 245, at 7.
260 Id. at 7-8.
261 Id. at 8. The ratio of imports to domestic production more than doubled, rising
from 78.9% in 1978 to 185.9% in 1984. Id.
262 See id. at 8-12.
263 Id. at 9.
264 Id.
265 Id. at 10-1 1. Domestic production fell from 2.7 million squares to 2.4 million
squares between 1983 and 1984, and fell again from 1.9 million squares to 1.4 million
squares between January to September 1984 and January to September 1985. Id. at 10.
The number of firms producing wood shakes and shingles dropped from 445 in 1978 to
255 in 1985. Id. at 11. Employment in the industry fell from 2,375 to 1,572 between 1983
and the period of January to September 1985. Id.
266 Id, at 12; see also id. at A-34.
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Considering all these industry trends in light of the stable domestic
market, the majority determined that the industry was suffering seri-
ous injury.
Finally, with regard to the final criteria, the majority determined
that increasing imports were a substantial cause of the serious injury
suffered by the wood shakes and shingles industry. 267 The majority
based this determination on increased imports, decreased domestic
production, and stable domestic consumption. 268 The majority de-
termined that no other cause was as great as increased imports in
causing the serious injury. 269 The majority considered arguments by
the respondents that other factors were responsible for any serious
injury suffered by the domestic industry. Respondents alleged that
declining sources of western red cedar and changes in demand for
the product were responsible for any serious injury to the domestic
industry. The majority found that neither of these factors was as sig-
nificant in explaining the problems of the domestic industry as were
increased imports. 270
Commissioners Eckes, Lodwick, and Rohr recommended that
the President impose a tariff of thirty-five percent on wood shakes
and shingles imports for five years. 271 The recommendation was
based on their judgment that an ad valorem tariff would best miti-
gate the price declines that imports caused in the domestic mar-
267 Id. at 13-14. The Commission noted that statutory provisions defined "substantial
cause" as "a cause which is important and not less [important] than any other cause." Id. at
12 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(4)). The statute instructs the Commission to consider all
relevant economic factors when analyzing whether imports are a substantial cause of the
serious injury, including "an increase in imports (either actual or relative to domestic pro-
duction) and a decline in the proportion of the domestic market supplied by domestic
producers." 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2)(C) (1988).
268 Wood Shakes and Shingles, supra note 245, at 14. The majority argued that in-
creased imports could be a substantial cause of serious injury at any point in the business
cycle, and that a downturn in the business cycle alone would not be one of the factors
considered in substantial cause analysis. See id. at 13 (citing Unwrought Coppper, USITC
Pub. 1549, Inv. No. 201-TA-52, at 12, n.31 (July 1984)).
269 Id. at 14-17.
270 Id. Although the majority agreed that in the next century a shortage of western red
cedar logs would likely have a serious impact on the domestic industry, it did not believe
that the availability of logs was presently a major problem for the domestic industry. See id.
at 15; but see id. at 15 n.48 (Chairman Stern found this already to be a serious problem for
the domestic industry).
The Commission also discounted the effect of short-term demand-that is, changes in
the demand for wood shakes and shingles caused by changes in the demand for housing.
The majority noted that during 1984 and 1985, demand for housing increased, but wood
shakes and shingles prices did not increase and the industry's fortunes did not improve.
Therefore, changes in short-term demand could not explain the serious injury suffered by
the domestic industry. Id. at 16-17.
Similarly, the majority determined that long-term demand factors, such as the safety
and fire-retardant characteristics of wood shakes and shingles and the availablity of price-
competitive substitutes, were not as important causes of the serious injury as increased
imports. It noted that any shift in demand away from wood shakes and shingles was grad-
ual, and was not particularly significant during the critical 1983 to 1985 period. Id. at 17.
271 Id. at 19.
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ket.2 7 2 They estimated that a tariff of that magnitude would restore
import penetration to historic levels. 2 73 The Commissioners re-
jected the use of adjustment assistance, criticizing these programs as
"inadequately funded" and "ineffectively administered.' '274 The
Commissioners also rejected a recommendation to impose quotas in
this investigation. While quotas would certainly control the level of
imports, the relatively inelastic domestic supply would most likely be
unable to respond effectively to a sudden shift in supply. 275
Chairman Paula Stern disagreed with this remedy. 276 She ar-
gued that fundamental structural problems in the industry meant
that tariffs would not solve the long-term problems of the industry.
Stern pointed to long-term declines in demand, caused by new fire
and building codes and an increasingly tight supply of the old-
growth red cedar logs which was the raw material used to make the
wood shakes and shingles at issue. 277 She argued that wood shakes
and shingles producers were facing a number of other causes which
made adjustment assistance a more appropriate remedy. 278
Stern discounted the effectiveness of the remedy recommended
by the majority. She argued that the price effect of a tariff would not
be sufficient in this case. First, she noted that Canadian producers
would pass the price increase along to consumers and would not ab-
sorb the increase themselves. 279 Second, because of limits in the
change of log prices and the availability of logs, domestic supply
elasticity was low, and the domestic producers would not be able to
respond quickly to the market opportunities created by higher Cana-
dian prices.2 80 Therefore, tariffs would not be particularly helpful in
raising prices. 2 8 1
Stern also argued that a tariff would not increase domestic pro-
duction or employment. First, increased prices for wood shakes and
272 The Commissioners noted that increasing prices could have a negative effect on
demand for wood shakes and shingles because of competition from other products, such
as asphalt shingles and aluminum siding. The Commissioners determined susbstitutability
was not so high as to prevent price increases. See id.
273 Id. at 20.
274 Id. at 21 (citing Nonrubber Footwear, USITC Pub. 1717, Inv. No. TA-201-55, at
115 (July 1985) (Views of Chairman Stern, Commissioners Eckes, Lodwick, and Rohr re-
garding remedy)). The Commissioners noted that the Department of Commerce did not
have funding for adjustment assistance at that time, and the Department of Labor only had
funding for training and other allowances for a six month period. See id. at 21.
275 Id. at 22.
276 Id. at 23-29.
277 Id. at 24-25. Stern noted that the supply of old-growth red cedar logs was suffi-
cient only for the next twenty years. Id. at 25. She also argued that U.S. producers real-
ized this fact and their primary objective in this whole process was to gain access to
,Canadian old-growth red cedar logs. Id. at 27.
278 Id. at 23-24.
279 Id. at 31.
280 Id. at 32.
281 Id. at 32 n.23, (citing Memorandum EC-J- 114).
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shingles would not automatically cause the supply to increase. The
raw material, old-growth red cedar, was harvested with a number of
other kinds of trees, and the harvest of old-growth red cedar was
subordinate to the harvest of these other species. 282 Second, the
prices for red cedar were independent of the prices of wood shakes
and shingles to a large degree.283 Third, the wood shakes and shin-
gles industry had a great deal of unused capacity, and there were few
barriers to entry in this industry. 28 4 Finally, there was some evidence
that wood shakes and shingles were used on more expensive homes,
the demand for which is not price sensitive and is relatively steady.
For these reasons, price increases would not be substantial, and they
did not automatically translate into increases in production. The
Commission staff estimated that the tarriff would increase employ-
ment by 24 to 183 workers, a number Stern termed "miniscule."
Stern concluded that the only appropriate solution was for firms
and workers to begin the process of adjusting to the inevitable loss of
their raw material and to begin producing something else. She ar-
gued that adjustment assistance was the most appropriate remedy
that the government could offer to help the industry, and that the
President should implement it in this case.
Vice Chairman Liebeler and Commissioner Brunsdale reached a
negative determination in the case. They found the same like prod-
uct and domestic industry as the majority.28 5 They also determined
that imports had increased and that the domestic industry was seri-
ously injured. 286 These two commissioners did not, however, find a
causal relationship between the increased imports and the serious
injury suffered by the domestic industry. These commissioners re-
lied on economic analysis to determine the lack of causality. 287
Their analysis focused on the supply and demand factors in the mar-
ket. They concluded that the demand for the product was relatively
more sensitive to price than was the supply of the product.288
Therefore, changes in the demand for wood shakes and shingles, not
increased imports, was the real cause of serious injury to the domes-
tic industry. 289
First, they examined the like product arguments in this investi-
gation. Looking at the use for shakes and shingles and the character-
282 Id. at 33. That is, loggers go into an area to harvest a number of different kinds of
trees. They seek out species other than red cedar, however, and the demand for red cedar
does not drive them into logging.
283 That is because red cedar has a number of end uses, and wood shakes and shingles
is not the most important end use. Other uses drive the price of logs.
284 Thus, getting price increases to stick is more difficult in this industry.
285 Wood Shakes and Shingles, supra note 245, at 42-44.
286 Id. at 45-54.
287 Id. at 57.
288 Id. at 72.
289 Id. at 72-73.
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istics of these products and other roofing materials, they determined
that western red cedar and northern white cedar shakes and shingles
were like products and that other roofing materials were not like
products. 290 Second, they questioned whether the requirement for
increased imports could be satisfied by an increase in the relative
market share of the imports. 29' Vice Chairman Liebeler argued that,
given the legislative history and the plain meaning of the statute, the
Commission should only consider absolute increases in imports. 292
Third, looking at the data presented on the industry's condition,
they concurred with the majority that the domestic wood shakes and
shingles industry was suffering serious injury. 293 Fourth, they ana-
lyzed the issue of whether imports were a substantial cause of the
serious injury. They stressed the importance of ensuring that im-
ports are "causing" the injury. Merely observing that certain things
are occurring in the market at the same time was not enough. 294
They proposed to examine the causal relationship by the use of de-
mand and supply analysis.2 95
The analysis of this market required a look at three components:
the domestic demand for wood shakes and shingles, the domestic
supply of U.S. producers, and the import supply of foreign produ-
cers. 296 Demand examines those factors relating to consumer pref-
erences and economic activity. Supply tends to focus on the state of
production technology, the availability of raw materials and labor,
the existence of alternative markets, and the distinct advantages of
U.S. and foreign producers.2 97 These three components determine
290 See id. at 43-44. Liebeler and Brunsdale noted that wood shakes and wood shingles
have the same use as roofing and siding materials, and also have the same characteristics-
similar appearance, quality and texture. Id. They stated that northern white cedar and red
cedar are woods that share a number of characteristics--vertical grain, light weight, strong
resistance to rot and insect damage, and good nail-holding qualities. Id. Finally, they de-
cided to exclude other materials, such as asphalt and aluminum siding, because these
materials were not made from the same raw materials as wood shakes and shingles and
thus did not have the same "intrinsic characteristics" as wood shakes and shingles. Id. at
44. Because they reached a negative determination under this analysis, which provided
petitioners with their greatest opportunity for success on the merits, they did not examine
the possibility that these other materials might be directly competitive. Including them
within the like product definition would have diluted the petitioners' case and thus would
have had no effect on the outcome. Id.
291 Id. at 45. "
292 See id. at 46-48. Commissioner Brunsdale did not find it necessary to reach the
issue in this case, since imports were increasing absolutely and relatively. See id. at 46 n. 11.
293 See id. at 53-54.
294 For example, the facts that imports are rising and that the domestic industry is
injured do not by themselves reveal a causal relationship. Some effort must be taken to
show that the increase in imports was one of the factors that caused the serious injury.
295 See Wood Shakes and Shingles, supra note 245, at 57. For a further elaboration of
the model, see id. at 81-90.
296 Id. at 57. In some instances, the analysis will require consideration of four compo-
nents when the demand for the imported and the domestic product is distinct. Such analy-
sis is often referred to as four-curve analysis.
297 Id. at 58.
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the price for the good, as well as the quantity produced by manufac-
turers. Any change in price or quantity can be directly linked to a
change in one of these variables. 298 Therefore, Liebeler and Brun-
sdale argued that everything that affects the domestic industry can be
expressed in terms of one of these three components. 299
Three events involving these components will cause injury to
the domestic industry: a decrease in domestic demand, a decline in
domestic supply, or an increase in imported supply.300 By examin-
ing the evidence in an investigation and attempting to discern what is
happening in the marketplace, the injury can be attributed to one of
the three shifts described here. In addition, the causal relationship
between the injury sustained and its source can be determined, thus
allowing a determination of whether imports are a substantial cause
of injury and eliminating some of the guesswork in these investiga-
tions. 30' Finally, they concluded that both an increase in foreign
supply and a decrease in domestic demand could be linked to the
fortunes of the domestic industry. 30 2
There are several advantages to this approach. First, it gives the
Commission a methodology for determining whether imports are a
substantial cause of serious injury, and as great a cause as any
other.30 3 Second, this methodology uses a great deal of hard data
and thereby avoids anecdotal evidence. Third, the approach is pre-
dictable and offers a consistent analytical framework for Commission
use, allowing parties to understand more clearly the Commission's
analysis of these cases. Fourth, the data for this approach are readily
available. Finally, Liebeler and Brunsdale claimed that this approach
is consistent with "intuitive notions" of causation used by other
298 The facts gathered in each investigation will point to factors that affect one of these
three components and thus affect the price and quantity. See id. at 59.
299 Id. at 61-62.
300 Id. at 62, n.44. For example, a decline in construction and homebuilding will cause
a decrease in the demand for wood shakes and shingles, thus injuring the domestic indus-
try. A decrease in production caused by raw material shortages will cause a decrease in
domestic supply. Decreased foreign demand or decreased foreign costs will cause an in-
crease in foreign supply. These are three concrete examples of injury caused to the do-
mestic industry, as expressed through these three components of the market. See id. at 62-
63.
301 See id. at 63-64. Liebeler and Brunsdale also noted that this approach is supported
by legislative history for the escape clause. The legislative history states:
The existence of any of these factors such as the growth in inventory
would not in itself be relevant to the threat of injury from imports if it re-
sulted from conditions unrelated to imports. Such conditions could arise
from a variety of other causes, such as changes in technology or consumer
tastes, domestic competition from substitute products, plant obsolescence,
or poor mangagement.
S. Rep. No. 1298, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 120 (1974).
302 If the cause of serious injury is related to a decrease in domestic supply or a de-
crease in demand accompanied by an increase in imports, then imports are not the sub-
stantial cause of serious injury, but an effect that accompanies the shift in domestic
demand or supply.
303 Wood Shakes and Shingles, supra note 245, at 65.
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Commissioners. 3 04
Applying this methodology, Liebeler and Brunsdale discovered
two facts that stood out in the investigation. First, demand was de-
clining in the domestic market.3 0 5 They also noted that imports
from Canada increased by a similar amount over the same period.3 0 6
Both factors had the potential for causing harm to the domestic in-
dustry, so the Commissioners had to determine which of these fac-
tors was more substantial in causing the injury. Liebler and
Brunsdale believed that because import supply is relatively insensi-
tive to changes in price, an increase in the supply of imports would
have the effect of increasing consumption with very little price ef-
fect.3 0 7 Because domestic demand is relatively price sensitive, while
supply is relatively insensitive to price, the market price will decline
dramatically when demand falls.30 8 This decline caused the adverse
impact on the domestic industry in this case. Thus, they concluded
that there was no injury or threat of injury cause by imports in this
investigation.3 0 9
In terms of remedy, Brunsdale and Liebeler noted that the pur-
pose of escape clause relief is either to "facilitate a 'more orderly'
transfer of resources out of the industry"3 10 or to allow the industry
time to adjust and to compete more effectively against foreign com-
petition.3 1' First, they noted that neither a thirty-five percent tariff
nor import quotas would do much to help the domestic industry ad-
just.3 1 2 They then examined adjustment assistance, and Commis-
sioner Brunsdale agreed with Chairman Stern that adjustment
assistance was the appropriate remedy.3 13 Vice Chairman Liebeler,
however, believed that none of the remedies available would be ef-
fective, and that no remedy should be provided.3 1 4
Ultimately, the President decided that relief for the wood shakes
and shingles producers was in the national economic interest.3 1 5 He
recommended an increase in the tariff on imports of wood shakes
304 Id.
305 Id. at 67-68. They noted that domestic consumption was 20% lower in 1984 and
1985 than in 1978, and was at the same level as domestic consumption in 1980.
306 Id.
307 Id. at 69-71.
308 Id. at 72.
309 Id. at 73.
310 Id. at 75. They argued that the purpose of relief in this case is to allow an orderly
adjustment so that firms' contract and economic resources-labor and captial-were put
to productive use in other areas with minimal amounts of pain and dislocation.
3'' Id.
312 Id. at 76-79. Chairman Stern reached the same conclusion through analysis of the
nature of the industry. See supra notes 279-84 and accompanying text.
313 Wood Shakes Shingles, supra note 245, at 79.
314 Id. at 79-80. Vice Chairman Liebeler did prefer adjustment assistance to tariffs. Id.
at 80.
315 See Temporary Duty Increase on the Importation Into the United States of Wood
Shingles and Shakes of Western Red Cedar, Proclamation No. 5498, 3 C.F.R. 85-86
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and shingles for five years.316 For the first thirty months, the tariff
rate would be thirty-five percent.3 17 For the next twenty-four
months, the increased tariff rate would be twenty percent, and for
the final eighteen months, the increased tariff rate would be eight
percent.3 18 At the same time, the President requested advice from
the Commission on the probable economic impact of termination of
relief after the tariff had been in place for thirty months.3 19
1. Section 203 Investigation
As requested, the Commission initiated an investigation into the
probable economic effect on the domestic industry of termination of
relief in this case. 320 The Commission investigated and made its rec-
ommendations to the President. As in the original case, the Com-
mission did not ageee on its advice. Acting Chairwoman Brunsdale
and Commissioners Cass and Liebeler concluded that the tariff had
not been effective in improving the competitive position of the do-
mestic wood shakes and shingles industry. Also, the main effect of
the tariff had been to increase prices at the expense of the consumer
and to the benefit of producers without any improvement in the do-
mestic industry's ability to compete.321
Brunsdale, Cass, and Liebeler argued that the statute required
them to consider the effect of termination on four discrete groups:
the domestic industry producing the like product, the communities
and other industries most closely affiliated with the industry seeking
or receiving relief, U.S. consumers, and industries affected indirectly
by the decision on relief and other general national and international
economic interests. 322 They concluded that, with the exception of
consumers, who were greatly disadvantaged by the continuation of
relief, the evidence was mixed. Therefore, they recommended that
(1986). See also Memorandum from the United States Trade Representative, Western Red
Cedar Shakes and Shingles Import Relief Determination, 51 Fed. Reg. 19,157 (1986).
316 3 C.F.R. at 86.
317 Id.
318 Id.
319 He noted that if general market condtions warrant the continued imposition of
relief, and if the domestic producers have begun to make reasonable progress toward ad-
justment, relief should be continued for the entire five-year period. 51 Fed. Reg. 19,157
(1986).
320 See Western Red Cedar Shakes and Shingles, USITC Pub. 2131, Inv. No. TA-203-
18 (Oct. 1988) [hereinafter Western Red Cedar Shakes and Shingles] (citing letter from
Ambassador Yeutter to Acting Chairman Alfred Eckes, dated June 29, 1988). The Com-
mission issued a public notice initiating the investigation on July 20, 1988. See Wood
Shakes and Shingles, 53 Fed. Reg. 27,410 (July 20, 1988). A public hearing was held on
August 16, 1988, and the Commission announced its advice on October 6, 1988.
As noted by Commissioners Brunsdale, Cass, and Liebeler, the point of comparison is
the difference between no tariff and a 20% tariff, since that was the scheduled rate on the
date in question. See Western Red Cedar Shakes and Shingles, supra, at 5-6.
321 See Western Red Cedar Shakes and Shingles, supra note 320, at 30-31.
322 Id. at 6.
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the President terminate the tarriffA2 3
They argued that while terminating relief would have an adverse
effect on the domestic industry, continuing relief would not support
adjustment efforts by domestic industry. To date, the benefits of the
increased tariff had flowed primarily to timber owners and the pro-
ducers of red cedar logs. 3 24 They noted that the industry had done
very little to adjust to imports over the past two years, and, in fact,
very little could be done to adjust to import competitition without
increasing the availability of old-growth western red cedar logs.3 2 5
Finally, they argued that lower-priced imports would harm mainly
the suppliers of western red cedar logs and the timber owners, as
prices were driven down in the U.S. market.326 Thus, they argued
that continuing the tariff would serve little purpose in assisting the
domestic wood shakes and shingles producers.
Second, these Commissioners concluded that a change in the
tariff would have little adverse effect on the communities in which
the industry is concentrated or on affiliated industries.32 7 Measured
by sale, employment, or profits, this industry was small when com-
pared with the economy of the two states in which it is concen-
trated.3 28 Related industries, such as housing construction and
those industries which use western red cedar, were more significant
parts of the economy and should benefit from a reduction in the
tariff.3 29
Third, they argued that consumers would benefit dramatically if
the tariff were removed. They noted that the Commission staff esti-
mated that eliminating the tariff, rather than reducing it to 20%,
would save U.S. consumers an estimated $10 to $20 million.330 Fi-
323 Id. at 7-8.
324 As noted in the opinion, 80% of the price increase in wood shakes and shingles
was reflected in higher log prices, and did not result in increased benefits for the domestic
industry. Id.
325 Id. at 7. As noted, no other wood duplicates the qualities of old-growth western
red cedar-in terms of weathering, insect resistance, aesthetic, and nail-holding qualitites.
Id. at 10. As old-growth western red cedar stocks in the United States have been depleted,
the trees available for harvest are found interspersed among other hardwoods. Thus, log-
gers primarily go after these other hardwoods, with the hunt for red cedar being a secon-
dary consideration.
Because of this limited supply of cedar logs, the volume of domestic production has
not responded to the price increase prompted by the increased price of Canadian wood
shakes and shingles. Instead, the domestic producers have also increased their price,
although evidence indicates that most of this price increase was absorbed by the increased
price of red cedar logs. Id. at 12-13.
326 Id.
327 Id. at 22.
328 Id. The two states are Washington and Oregon. Even in the specific communities
in which production facilities are located, producers are not the most significant employ-
ers. Id. at 23.
329 Cheaper wood shakes and shingles should help the housing industry. Lower prices
for western red cedar logs should assist the other industries. Id. at 23.
350 Id. at 24 (citing appendix at A-37).
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nally, they contended that removal of the tariff would benefit the
overall economic interests of the United States in several ways. Re-
moval would cause the Canadians to drop the retaliatory tariff put in
place against a number of U.S. products as compensation for the
tariff on wood shakes and shingles. 33 1 The Canadians had placed a
number of new restrictions on the export of western red cedar logs,
which limited exports to the United States. 33 2 While the evidence on
whether the Canadians would relax rules on exports was mixed,
there was at least some hope of greater imports of logs if the tariff on
Canadian wood shakes and shingles were removed. 33 3
Commissioners Eckes, Lodwick, and Rohr concluded that "mar-
ket conditions do not warrant a departure from the President's pro-
gram of import relief."' 3 34 They analyzed the current state of the
domestic industry and determined that the domestic industry had
improved during the period of import relief, but still exhibited signs
of weakness. 3 35 They studied the efforts of U.S. producers to adjust
to import competition and concluded that they had made "reason-
able progress" in adjusting to import competition during this pe-
riod. 336 Finally, they studied the probable economic effect of
terminating relief and concluded that if relief were terminated, "the
effect on the domestic industry could be devastating. ' 3 37
In their examination of the current condition of the domestic
industry, they noted that production had increased through most of
the period of investigation with a slight decline in interim 1988.338
Capacity increased between 1985 and 1987, and then remained
steady through 1988. 3 39 Capacity utilization followed a similar
trend, although it declined slightly in interim 1988.340 Domestic
producers were highly profitable from 1986 through interim 1988,
and prices for wood shakes and shingles increased throughout the
period.341
The Commissioners noted a number of efforts on the part of the
331 Id. at 26-27. The retaliatory tariffs were placed on certain books, catalogs of publi-
cations issued by non-Canadian publishers, printed music, computer parts, semiconductor
devices, tea bags, diesel motor rail cars, oatmeal and rolled oats, trees, cider, asphalt pav-
ing oil, and ozone generators. See id. at 26, n.53, (citing appendix at A-43).
332 Id. at 28.
333 See id. at 28-30.
334 Id. at 41. Commissioner Lodwick reached the further conclusion that terminating
import relief would have an adverse effect on the domestic industry. Id. at 41 n.29.
335 Id. at 34.
336 Id. at 36-37.
337 Id. at 40.
338 Specifically, production was 1.6 million squares in 1985, 2.1 million squares in
1986, and 2.2 million squares in 1987. Id. at 35 (citing appendix at A-7). In interim 1987,




341 Id. at 35-36.
[VOL. 15
EC & U.S. ESCAPE CLAUSE
domestic industry to adjust to import competition. Producers in-
vested in new equipment, such as automatic shake saws and new
shingle machines, to increase productivity and allow use of a lower
grade of western red cedar.3 4 2 They also invested in equipment that
allowed them to use more effeciently the available supply of western
red cedar. 343 Finally, the industry was undertaking a number of re-
search projects designed to expand the raw material sources for
wood shakes and shingles. 34 4
Finally, these Commissioners concluded that "there is no reason
to believe that imports would not increase to their pre-relief levels"
if relief were terminated. 34 5 They noted that the Canadian industry
was large and had the ability to respond quickly to the reduction of
tariffs that were harming it.346 They argued that a number of factors,
such as a Canadian loggers' strike, a strong Canadian dollar, and
strong cyclical demand for shakes and shingles, currently favored the
domestic industry. 34 7 Any change in these factors, however, would
prove quite serious and potentially devastating for the domestic in-
dustry. They therefore concluded that the relief should remain in
the staged form as presently planned.
The President agreed to keep tariffs in place, although he accel-
erated the tariff rate reductions. 348 The tariff would be twenty per-
cent for one year, ten percent for the next year, and five percent for
the final six months.3 4 9 Based on the Commission report and advice
from the Secretaries of Labor and Commerce, he determined that it
was in the national interest to accelerate the reduction of duties be-
cause of the burden on consumers and the increased use of nonwood
roofing materials. 350
The value of these opinions lies in the method of discussion by
the Commission. The outstanding issues in the application of the
escape clause legislation are discussed in the majority, in the dis-
sents, and in additional views. Arguments are outlined and ex-
plained based on legal precedent and other forms of analysis,
including economic analysis. The existence of this type of opinion
allows the reader to discover controversial areas, such as the ability
to find the causal link between imports and serious injury to the do-
342 Id. at 37.
343 See id. at 37-38. These new machines included new shake splitters, new log decks,
and wood chippers. Id.
344 Id. at 38-39.
345 Id. at 39.
346 Id. at 39-40.
347 Id. at 40.
348 See To Modify the Import Relief on Western Red Cedar Shakes and Shingles, Proc-
lamation No. 5925, 3 C.F.R. 542 (1988). The prior schedule had been a 20% tariff in
place from December 7, 1988, through December 6, 1990, and an 8% tariff from Decem-
ber 7, 1990, through June 6, 1991. See supra notes 315-18 and accompanying text.
349 3 C.F.R. at 544.
350 Id. at 543.
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mestic industry. The reader can find different methods for finding
this causal link in the different parts of the opinions, and thus the
reader can focus on specific controversies, whereas EEC opinions
give the reader no indication of the areas of greatest concern to the
Commission.
V. Comparison of Provisions
Both the European and the U.S. systems have features that im-
prove their effectiveness and help them keep domestic industies and
trading partners satisfied. The desirable European features tend to
emphasize the political nature of these cases. The U.S. strengths are
in the areas of analysis and the development of theories of law to
explain decisions that are made.
A. Surveillance by the Europeans
The strongest unique feature of the European system is the use
of surveillance. 351 This outcome provides the Europeans with a
handy intermediate step that avoids the harshness of economic sanc-
tions but provides the domestic industry concerned with an effective
remedy from increasingly injurious imports. This remedy has a great
deal of political expediency to it. It provides a strong signal to im-
porting countries that they are causing some dislocation in the EEC
and that they need to be judicious in importing that product if they
want to avoid harsher sanctions on that particular item. It allows the
Europeans to avoid alienating their trading partners by using a more
subtle approach in their international economic relations. The
Europeans thus can benefit from reduced imports without raising
any tensions with their trading partners. The United States has no
such step; any U.S. relief that is granted has a significant effect on the
importers involved. The United States has no mechanism for placat-
ing domestic industry that does not penalize importers.
Surveillance may be more appropriate in threat cases. This
method allows the Europeans to monitor closely industries that may
be experiencing increasing competition from imports. 352 Because
implementing surveillance is not by itself a very dramatic step, it al-
lows the Europeans to adopt this measure early on, before a domes-
tic industry experiences a great deal of harm. Thus, because of the
milder nature of surveillance, in practice the Europeans can survey
more products than those the United States places sanctions against.
It may also be a more appropriate solution in threat cases where it is
less clear that companies need relief from imports to survive. Fi-
nally, monitoring import trends assists authorities in gathering and
351 See supra notes 29-42 and accompanying text.
352 Surveillance data is collected monthly or quarterly.
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publishing data so that a more accurate picture of the industry and
domestic consumption can be gathered to watch the health of the
domestic industry. This provision is one that has clear benefits and
should be adopted by the United States. It would help the United
States avoid some of the trade tension that has been rising as the
United States seeks to control imports and open markets. It has cer-
tainly afforded the Europeans the opportunity to avoid trade cases
and seek a lower pressure solution to the trade problems caused by
rising imports. 353
B. Trade Regulations as Political Compromises
The European Community, with its diverse interests and popu-
lations, has a strong need for solutions that satisfy diverse interests.
The use of escape clause regulations illustrates this point.
Surveillance is a politically expedient solution in the case where
diverse interests cannot agree on whether sanctions that invariably
will help and hurt different groups should be implemented. Surveil-
lance can be viewd as a consensus-maintaining tool-a way to give
members of a coalition a bonus so that they will remain in the coali-
tion and support other goals. Surveillance gives these members a
sense of satisfaction on a matter of some importance for them but of
lesser importance for other members, while not penalizing less-inter-
ested members with sanctions that would affect their consumers.
The surveillance mechanism could assist the escape clause pro-
cess in the United States by allowing policymakers to avoid reaching
impasses over escape clause cases when differing interests present
themselves in cases. Often, to avoid upsetting a particular constitu-
ency or hurting consumers, relief is not granted because the meas-
ures available are too harsh. Surveillance gives policymakers the
opportunity to please different constituencies without causing ex-
treme dislocation in the process. It provides a safety valve in the
system without creating a great deal of tension.
The example of surveillance illustrates the fact that escape
clause relief serves a largely political role to assist domestic indus-
tries caught in a cycle of increasing imports. The rationale of adjust-
ment to lowering tariff rates in escape clause cases no longer applies.
The fact that escape clause relief serves a largely political role makes
a variety of responses desirable. Relief that helps some constituen-
cies without hurting others is necessary in some cases and makes
remedies like surveillance very desirable.
353 The number of escape clause cases has been significantly lower in Europe. Since
Regulation 288/82 has been in effect, six cases have been filed in the EEC, versus fifteen
during the same period in the United States.
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C. Analysis in Opinions
As a system more bound to legal precedent, the U.S. system
consists of opinions that consistently go into greater detail and make
more of an effort to use economic analysis and promote a legal
framework for uniting decisions in a consistent framework than do
the decisions of the EEC. On a very basic level, the U.S. decisions
are longer, go into greater detail, and contain dissents and additional
views that explain points of controversy in interpreting the law. The
public gets an idea of current controversies in the approaches and
methodologies used to interpret data and escape clause law. Dis-
sents and additional views allow for the development of new legal
theories, providing a "laboratory" for new proposals in the develop-
ment of escape clause laws.
EEC cases tend to rely very heavily on analysis of business and
financial trends, without much reference to economic analysis or
legal precedent. EEC cases also explain very little and do not elabo-
rate on in-depth discussions held by the Commission in its efforts to
resolve the safeguard cases brought before it.
D. Statutory Direction
The regulations in the EEC give much less direction to the Com-
mission than is provided to the ITC by the U.S. trade statutes. 354
These provisions indicate the amount of fine tuning done by the U.S.
Congress to improve the coverage of the statute and increase the
amount of protection afforded to domestic producers. Congress has,
in essence, attempted to close "loopholes" and respond to pressure
from domestic constituencies. 35 5
This has not happened in the EEC. The regulation remains rel-
atively untouched since its enactment in 1982. The only major
amendment to this regulation was a provision designed to limit the
ability of individual member states to implement protective legisla-
tion without going through the EEC Commission. Thus, the EEC
has resisted the temptation to alter the regulations to create greater
protection for its industries, in part because of the protection already
there, and in part because domestic political constituencies are cur-
rently satisfied with the regulations.
E. Remedies
One area where the U.S. system is superior is in the develop-
ment of remedies to assist domestic industries. EEC regulations
354 Compare Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, art. 9 with 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2)(A)
(1988).
355 This trend is especially pronounced in the 1988 Act. See notes 156-71 and accom-
panying text.
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leave the question open. 356 On the other hand, the United States
has specified eight kinds of remedies in these cases.3 57 The U.S. sys-
tem is preferable because parties know before filing a case which
remedies are available and can determine whether an appropriate
remedy exists for their alleged injury.
F. Private Parties
Although the U.S. Government and other public bodies can file
escape clause cases, the burden is usually carried by private parties
with an extreme interest in the outcome of the case. Conversely, in
Europe, Member States are responsible for initiating a case and pro-
vide a substantial amount of the information. Private parties are in-
volved in the EEC, but to a much lesser extent than in the United
States. The U.S. system is more responsive to the affected industry
since more acutely interested private parties are responsible for pro-
viding information and arguments to the decisionmaking body.
VI. Conclusion
There are a number of differences between the European and
the U.S. system. Certain provisions from each system have advan-
tages that should be employed by both. The Europeans enjoy the
understanding that this process is primarily a political mechanism
and an opportunity for satisfying domestic industry demands to re-
strict imports. The European system has the advantage of flexibility,
both in its ability to apply the intermediate option of surveillance,
and in its informal procedures, which result from a broadly sketched
set of regulations. The U.S. system has the advantage of openness.
Remedies are listed for the parties to examine and determine their
usefulness. Issues of contention are presented to the public in the
opinions drafted by the ITC. In addition, private parties with an
acute interest in the proceeding are normally the parties responsible
for presenting evidence and arguing before the decisionmaker. Both
systems have their strengths, and when opportunities for revision of
the escape clause legislation occur, lawmakers should consider incor-
porating the strengths of the other system.
356 See Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, art. 15, para. 2.
357 See 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a)(3) (1988).
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